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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
	  Forged	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  September	  11,	  2001,	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  partnership	  has	  been	  plagued	  by	  tension	  and	  setbacks.	  	  As	  U.S.	  forces	  commence	  a	  drawdown	  in	  Afghanistan,	  the	  perceived	  reduced	  importance	  of	  Pakistan	  to	  U.S.	  interests	  creates	  an	  opening	  for	  Beijing	  and	  Islamabad	  to	  deepen	  their	  strategic	  relationship.	  	  Meanwhile,	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  tensions	  remain	  high,	  and	  Pakistan	  continues	  to	  advance	  its	  nuclear	  program	  to	  hedge	  against	  India’s	  conventional	  military	  might.	  	  Fissile	  material	  production	  is	  on	  the	  rise,	  and	  new	  delivery	  systems	  are	  being	  introduced.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Pakistan	  continues	  to	  struggle	  with	  myriad	  internal	  security	  problems	  including	  a	  separatist	  insurgency,	  mounting	  religious	  extremism,	  and	  militancy.	  	  Taken	  together,	  these	  trends	  have	  triggered	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  debate	  in	  four	  key	  subject	  areas:	  	  (1)	  nuclear	  proliferation,	  (2)	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  nuclear	  stability,	  (3)	  the	  security	  and	  safety	  of	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  program,	  and	  (4)	  the	  future	  of	  nuclear	  energy	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  This	  report	  surveys	  these	  four	  issues,	  drawing	  from	  a	  decade	  of	  Track	  II	  meetings	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Pakistani	  stakeholders,	  as	  well	  as	  trilateral	  events	  involving	  Indian	  participants.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  this	  report	  provides	  insight	  on	  strategic	  thought	  processes	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  status	  and	  trajectory	  of	  its	  nuclear	  posture.	  	  The	  authors	  also	  identify	  deficiencies	  in	  the	  Track	  II	  process	  with	  Pakistan	  and	  recommend	  various	  solutions	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  and	  breadth	  of	  the	  discourse.	  	  Although	  the	  global	  nonproliferation	  regime	  failed	  to	  prevent	  Pakistan	  and	  India	  from	  obtaining	  the	  bomb,	  proliferation	  remains	  a	  prominent	  subject	  in	  South	  Asia.	  	  After	  the	  2004	  busting	  of	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  network,	  Pakistan	  found	  itself	  accused	  of	  illicitly	  exporting	  sensitive	  nuclear	  technologies.	  	  Islamabad	  took	  steps	  to	  rectify	  matters	  by	  dismantling	  the	  domestic	  elements	  of	  the	  network,	  interrogating	  Khan,	  and	  strengthening	  national	  export	  controls,	  but	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  scandal	  continues	  to	  mar	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  reputation.	  	  Today,	  however,	  the	  more	  urgent	  proliferation	  concern	  is	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  nuclear	  arsenals	  in	  South	  Asia.	  	  Pakistan	  has	  introduced	  six	  new	  delivery	  systems	  since	  2000,	  and	  fissile	  material	  production	  is	  set	  to	  increase	  with	  a	  new	  uranium	  mine	  in	  Khyber	  Pakhtunkhwa	  and	  a	  fourth	  plutonium	  production	  reactor	  at	  the	  Khushab	  complex.	  	  India,	  meanwhile,	  is	  fielding	  the	  Agni-­‐V	  intermediate-­‐range	  ballistic	  missile	  and	  the	  submarine-­‐launched	  K-­‐15/Sagarika.	  	  The	  vertical	  proliferation	  contest	  in	  South	  Asia	  is	  inflaming	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  tensions	  and	  undermining	  nuclear	  stability	  on	  the	  subcontinent.	  Nuclear	  stability	  is	  the	  most	  scrutinized	  topic	  in	  Track	  II	  dialogues	  with	  Pakistan.	  	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  are	  embroiled	  in	  a	  classic	  security	  dilemma,	  fueled	  by	  mutual	  mistrust	  rooted	  in	  the	  unresolved	  Kashmir	  dispute	  and	  aggravated	  by	  terrorism.	  	  If	  deterrence	  fails	  and	  a	  cross-­‐border	  skirmish	  escalates	  into	  a	  full-­‐scale	  war,	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  nuclear	  exchange	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out.	  	  The	  subjects	  of	  Kashmir	  and	  terrorism	  have	  been	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  the	  academic	  literature	  on	  South	  Asia,	  but	  Track	  II	  gatherings	  have	  explored	  several	  
U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  Nuclear	  Relations:	  A	  Strategic	  Survey	   2	  
other	  variables	  that	  are	  undermining	  the	  prospects	  for	  long-­‐term	  peace.	  	  These	  variables	  include	  doctrinal	  mismatch,	  rapid	  advancements	  in	  weapons	  technology,	  and	  bilateral	  gridlock	  in	  confidence-­‐building	  and	  arms	  control	  measures.	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  nuclear	  and	  military	  doctrines	  are	  at	  odds.	  	  India’s	  nuclear	  doctrine	  eschews	  first	  use	  but	  vows	  to	  massively	  retaliate	  against	  any	  use	  of	  WMD	  against	  Indian	  forces,	  anywhere.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  doctrine	  allows	  for	  first	  use	  but	  is	  ambiguous	  regarding	  its	  nuclear	  redlines.	  	  India	  is	  nonetheless	  confident	  that	  its	  massive	  retaliatory	  capability	  and	  declared	  intent	  would	  deter	  a	  Pakistani	  nuclear	  strike.	  	  By	  extension,	  India	  believes	  it	  has	  enough	  space	  to	  wage	  a	  limited	  war	  against	  Pakistan	  without	  triggering	  a	  nuclear	  response.	  	  This	  conviction	  is	  reflected	  in	  India’s	  “proactive”	  conventional	  war	  doctrine,	  which	  would	  entail	  a	  swift	  but	  shallow	  ground	  incursion	  into	  Pakistan	  using	  division-­‐sized	  ground	  formations,	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  integrated	  battle	  groups	  (IBGs).	  	  The	  goal	  of	  such	  an	  operation	  would	  not	  be	  to	  seize	  significant	  territory,	  but	  to	  inflict	  considerable	  damage	  on	  Pakistani	  military	  forces	  in	  retaliation	  for	  Islamabad’s	  failure	  to	  prevent	  cross-­‐border	  terrorists	  from	  striking	  India.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  deter	  Indian	  adventurism,	  Pakistan	  has	  introduced	  a	  suite	  of	  new	  weapons	  technologies.	  	  Short-­‐range	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons	  (TNW)	  have	  already	  been	  fielded,	  and	  sea-­‐based	  nuclear	  delivery	  systems	  are	  in	  the	  R&D	  pipeline.	  	  Pakistani	  participants	  in	  Track	  IIs	  are	  adamant	  that	  TNW	  would	  only	  be	  used	  as	  a	  last	  resort	  in	  a	  conflict	  with	  India.	  	  Western	  analysts,	  however,	  remain	  unconvinced.	  	  They	  fear	  Pakistan	  may	  deploy	  and	  possibly	  employ	  TNW	  early	  in	  a	  conflict	  as	  a	  signal	  of	  resolve,	  boosting	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  nuclear	  exchange.	  	  As	  for	  sea-­‐based	  systems,	  Pakistanis	  maintain	  they	  are	  for	  second-­‐strike	  purposes	  only,	  would	  never	  be	  utilized	  in	  a	  preemptive	  manner,	  and	  are	  a	  necessary	  riposte	  to	  India’s	  ballistic	  missile	  defenses.	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  intentions	  behind	  TNW	  and	  sea-­‐based	  deterrents,	  they	  raise	  a	  plethora	  of	  command	  and	  control	  (C2)	  issues.	  	  Pakistanis	  insist	  that	  C2	  for	  these	  systems	  is	  irrevocably	  centralized	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  civilian-­‐led	  National	  Command	  Authority.	  	  Yet	  centralized	  C2	  delays	  the	  launch	  process,	  making	  the	  systems	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  Indian	  preemption	  in	  the	  event	  of	  crisis	  or	  conflict.	  	  Dynamics	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  battle	  could	  potentially	  force	  Pakistan	  to	  abandon	  centralized	  C2	  in	  favor	  of	  predelegated	  launch	  authority.	  	  While	  predelegation	  would	  maximize	  the	  operational	  responsiveness	  of	  the	  systems,	  it	  also	  opens	  the	  door	  for	  inadvertent,	  premature,	  or	  unauthorized	  use.	  	  This	  dilemma	  is	  no	  different	  than	  what	  NATO	  faced	  in	  the	  early	  decades	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Another	  key	  factor	  undermining	  regional	  nuclear	  stability	  includes	  the	  tepid	  diplomatic	  progress	  in	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  confidence-­‐building	  measures	  (CBMs)	  and	  arms	  control.	  	  Both	  capitals	  are	  generally	  shy	  of	  accepting	  arms	  control	  initiatives	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  more	  weapons	  mean	  more	  national	  security.	  	  As	  an	  alternative,	  South	  Asia	  has	  traditionally	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embraced	  CBMs;	  examples	  currently	  on	  the	  books	  include	  advance	  warning	  of	  ballistic	  missile	  flight	  tests,	  pre-­‐notification	  of	  military	  exercises,	  and	  crisis	  hotlines	  between	  top	  civilian	  and	  military	  decision-­‐makers.	  	  Although	  many	  CBMs	  are	  in	  place,	  most	  of	  the	  low-­‐hanging	  fruit	  has	  already	  been	  plucked,	  and	  the	  political	  will	  to	  embark	  on	  new,	  more	  substantive	  CBMs	  is	  often	  lacking.	  	  In	  any	  case,	  CBMs	  alone	  are	  no	  panacea	  for	  security	  competition	  and	  instability.	  	  For	  sustainable	  peace	  to	  endure	  in	  South	  Asia,	  a	  strategic	  restraint	  regime	  –	  a	  regional	  security	  and	  arms	  control	  architecture	  –	  must	  be	  crafted.	  As	  the	  debate	  on	  South	  Asian	  nuclear	  stability	  continues,	  fissile	  material	  production	  and	  military	  spending	  proceed	  apace,	  and	  new	  delivery	  systems	  are	  being	  flight-­‐tested	  and	  fielded.	  	  In	  fact,	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  have	  flight-­‐tested	  more	  delivery	  systems	  since	  1998	  than	  any	  other	  state.1	  	  A	  crisis	  between	  Islamabad	  and	  New	  Delhi	  could	  escalate	  rapidly	  to	  a	  full-­‐scale	  war	  well	  before	  the	  international	  community	  is	  able	  to	  step	  in	  and	  defuse	  the	  situation.	  	  Geographic	  proximity,	  compressed	  mobilization	  timelines,	  and	  military	  necessity	  will	  make	  it	  difficult	  for	  either	  side	  to	  control	  the	  pace	  of	  escalation.	  	  The	  subcontinent	  remains	  a	  powder	  keg.	  Although	  nuclear	  stability	  continues	  to	  dominate	  Track	  II	  discussions,	  the	  subject	  of	  nuclear	  security	  and	  safety	  is	  gaining	  traction,	  borne	  from	  persistent	  fears	  of	  WMD	  terrorism.	  	  Pakistanis	  consistently	  stress	  that	  their	  nuclear	  stockpile	  and	  facilities	  are	  secure,	  their	  weapons	  are	  one-­‐point	  safe,	  their	  personnel	  are	  subject	  to	  rigorous	  background	  screening,	  and	  contingency	  plans	  are	  in	  place	  to	  manage	  a	  security	  breach	  or	  nuclear	  disaster.	  	  Pakistanis	  believe	  that	  a	  robust	  security	  and	  safety	  regime	  will	  remedy	  the	  backlash	  from	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  affair,	  portray	  their	  country	  as	  a	  responsible	  nuclear	  steward,	  and	  bolster	  Pakistan’s	  case	  for	  formal	  membership	  in	  the	  Nuclear	  Suppliers	  Group	  (NSG).	  	  Of	  note,	  a	  recent	  report	  by	  the	  Nuclear	  Threat	  Initiative	  cites	  demonstrable	  progress	  in	  Pakistani	  nuclear	  safeguards,	  and	  Pakistan	  has	  proudly	  advertised	  its	  regulatory	  and	  organizational	  controls	  in	  multiple	  Track	  I	  nuclear	  security	  summits.2	  	  Pakistan’s	  civilian	  nuclear	  energy	  program	  is	  another	  topic	  of	  recent	  Track	  II	  interest.	  	  Pakistan	  intends	  to	  generate	  8,800	  MW	  of	  nuclear	  power	  by	  2030,	  and	  new	  Chinese	  power	  plants	  are	  under	  construction	  in	  Karachi	  and	  Chashma.	  	  Although	  it	  is	  unlikely	  this	  ambitious	  target	  will	  be	  met,	  Pakistanis	  see	  nuclear	  power	  as	  an	  eventual	  remedy	  for	  the	  country’s	  energy	  crisis	  and	  a	  vehicle	  to	  enhance	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  legitimacy.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Michael	  Krepon	  and	  Julia	  Thompson,	  eds.,	  Deterrence	  Stability	  and	  Escalation	  Control	  in	  South	  Asia	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Stimson	  Center,	  2013),	  13.	  2	  NTI	  Nuclear	  Materials	  Security	  Index:	  Building	  a	  Framework	  for	  Assurance,	  Accountability,	  and	  Action	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Nuclear	  Threat	  Initiative,	  2014),	  129,	  http://ntiindex.org/wp-­‐content/uploads/2014/01/2014-­‐NTI-­‐Index-­‐Report.pdf.	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Track	  II	  discussion	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Pakistani	  stakeholders	  is	  ongoing	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  nuclear	  proliferation,	  stability,	  security	  and	  safety,	  and	  energy.	  	  Although	  Track	  II	  workshops	  provide	  an	  outlet	  for	  candid	  debate	  of	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  relations	  and	  areas	  of	  mutual	  concern,	  they	  do	  have	  their	  limitations.	  	  Track	  II	  findings	  are	  slow	  to	  influence	  official	  policy	  due	  to	  bureaucratic	  inertia.	  	  Furthermore,	  Track	  II	  suffers	  from	  redundancy	  because	  there	  are	  numerous	  sponsors	  and	  performers	  with	  no	  unity	  of	  effort.	  	  The	  benefits	  of	  Track	  II,	  nevertheless,	  outweigh	  the	  drawbacks.	  	  Track	  II	  “redundancy”	  generates	  a	  bank	  of	  expert	  analysis	  and	  provides	  deeper	  insight	  into	  a	  country’s	  strategic	  culture	  and	  threat	  perceptions.	  	  Moreover,	  Pakistani	  officials	  maintain	  a	  finger	  on	  the	  pulse	  of	  Track	  II	  discourse	  and	  are	  therefore	  continually	  exposed	  to	  fresh	  policy	  ideas.	  Track	  II	  has	  an	  important	  role	  to	  play	  in	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  relations,	  and	  this	  report	  proffers	  recommendations	  to	  improve	  future	  dialogues.	  	  Several	  topics	  have	  a	  chilling	  effect	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  discourse	  and	  should	  be	  downplayed	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  maintaining	  a	  productive	  meeting,	  chiefly:	  	  (1)	  allegations	  that	  Pakistan	  is	  providing	  safe	  havens	  to	  the	  Afghan	  Taliban;	  (2)	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  network;	  (3)	  the	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  nuclear	  deal;	  and	  (4)	  drone	  strikes	  and	  associated	  sovereignty	  concerns.	  	  Meanwhile,	  some	  issues	  have	  been	  largely	  overlooked	  and	  deserve	  newfound	  attention.	  	  Track	  IIs	  should	  begin	  to	  explore	  de-­‐escalation	  strategies	  for	  an	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  conflict,	  because	  thus	  far,	  discourse	  has	  focused	  exclusively	  on	  upward	  escalation	  dynamics.	  	  Workshops	  and	  exercises	  related	  to	  nuclear	  disaster	  preparedness,	  consequence	  management,	  and	  risk-­‐reduction	  measures	  would	  be	  a	  novel	  contribution	  to	  the	  security	  and	  safety	  culture	  in	  South	  Asia.	  	  Most	  importantly,	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  Track	  II	  nuclear	  dialogues	  should	  be	  expanded.	  	  Post-­‐2014,	  nuclear	  issues	  will	  return	  to	  prominence	  in	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  owing	  to	  shifting	  U.S.	  strategic	  priorities.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  key	  recommendations	  of	  this	  report	  is	  for	  Washington	  to	  identify	  a	  potential	  roadmap	  for	  normalizing	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  nuclear	  relations.	  	  Pakistanis	  argue	  they	  have	  atoned	  for	  the	  sins	  of	  A.Q.	  Khan,	  greatly	  enhanced	  their	  nuclear	  safeguards,	  and	  therefore	  deserve	  de	  facto	  recognition	  of	  their	  nuclear	  status.	  	  They	  point	  to	  the	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  nuclear	  deal	  as	  evidence	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  “playing	  favorites”	  in	  the	  region	  and	  unfairly	  discriminating	  against	  Pakistan.	  	  Although	  a	  “U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  nuclear	  deal”	  is	  not	  feasible	  at	  this	  juncture,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  consider	  supporting	  a	  criteria-­‐based	  approach	  for	  membership	  in	  the	  NSG,	  providing	  Islamabad	  an	  avenue	  for	  eventual	  accession.	  	  Doing	  so	  would	  help	  bury	  the	  vitriol	  of	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  controversy	  and	  the	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  nuclear	  deal.	  	  It	  would	  move	  the	  entire	  bilateral	  relationship	  forward	  in	  a	  constructive	  manner,	  coax	  Pakistan	  to	  drop	  its	  opposition	  to	  the	  Fissile	  Material	  Cutoff	  Treaty,	  and	  potentially	  induce	  Pakistan	  to	  slow	  its	  nuclear	  buildup,	  improving	  strategic	  stability	  on	  the	  subcontinent.	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INTRODUCTION 	  Since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  independent	  states	  of	  India	  and	  Pakistan,	  South	  Asia	  has	  endured	  repeated	  wars	  and	  military	  crises,	  conflict	  in	  Kashmir,	  and	  mounting	  religious	  extremism.	  	  U.S.	  policy,	  meanwhile,	  has	  struggled	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  the	  region’s	  volatile	  and	  shifting	  dynamics.	  	  From	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  the	  late	  1990s,	  the	  United	  States	  championed	  nonproliferation	  in	  South	  Asia	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  potential	  flashpoints	  for	  nuclear	  war.	  	  The	  region	  had	  become	  a	  hotbed	  for	  conventional	  conflict	  in	  the	  decades	  since	  partition,	  with	  three	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  wars	  (1947,	  1965,	  and	  1971)	  and	  one	  Sino-­‐Indian	  war	  (1962).	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  into	  this	  milieu	  was	  viewed	  as	  dangerous.	  	  With	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  refusing	  to	  sign	  or	  accede	  to	  the	  Nonproliferation	  Treaty	  (NPT),	  the	  United	  States	  imposed	  sanctions	  and	  helped	  establish	  international	  export	  control	  regimes	  to	  prevent	  the	  subcontinent	  from	  obtaining	  the	  bomb.	  U.S.	  nonproliferation	  policy	  in	  South	  Asia	  proved	  insufficient,	  however,	  when	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  tested	  a	  series	  of	  nuclear	  devices	  in	  1998.	  	  Preventing	  war	  between	  the	  now-­‐nuclear-­‐armed	  neighbors	  was	  now	  more	  urgent	  from	  a	  policy	  standpoint.	  	  Accordingly,	  the	  United	  States	  began	  to	  advocate	  nuclear	  stability	  policies	  to	  ease	  regional	  tensions	  and	  dissuade	  conflict.	  	  Washington	  spearheaded	  initiatives	  to	  limit	  vertical	  proliferation,	  induce	  strategic	  restraint,	  and	  relax	  force	  postures	  on	  the	  subcontinent.	  	  The	  events	  of	  9/11,	  however,	  interrupted	  these	  efforts	  and	  prompted	  another	  inflection	  in	  U.S.	  regional	  policy.	  	  The	  new	  focus	  was	  to	  defeat	  global	  terrorism,	  the	  nexus	  of	  which	  was	  the	  Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan	  border	  region.	  	  Practically	  overnight,	  Pakistan	  went	  from	  being	  a	  target	  of	  U.S.	  sanctions	  to	  being	  a	  critical	  partner	  in	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism.3	  Increasingly	  wary	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  nuclear-­‐armed	  terrorism,	  the	  United	  States	  began	  to	  emphasize	  nuclear	  security	  in	  Pakistan	  to	  prevent	  al-­‐Qaeda	  and	  other	  radical	  extremists	  from	  acquiring	  radiological	  or	  fissile	  materials.	  	  Nuclear	  safety,	  meanwhile,	  became	  a	  key	  action	  item	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  2011	  Fukushima	  disaster.	  	  Today,	  the	  security	  and	  safety	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  assets	  remain	  of	  paramount	  concern	  in	  Washington,	  owing	  to	  Pakistan’s	  continued	  struggles	  with	  domestic	  militancy.	  	  As	  Pakistan	  constructs	  new	  reactors	  and	  expands	  its	  civilian	  nuclear	  energy	  program,	  effective	  security	  and	  safety	  protocols	  are	  as	  important	  as	  ever.	  The	  complex	  nuclear	  trajectories	  of	  South	  Asia,	  combined	  with	  the	  events	  of	  September	  11,	  2001,	  have	  made	  regional	  expertise	  a	  critical	  commodity	  in	  Washington.	  	  After	  9/11,	  many	  think	  tanks,	  universities,	  and	  U.S.	  government	  agencies	  began	  to	  fund	  unofficial	  meetings	  between	  native	  South	  Asian	  experts	  and	  U.S.	  participants	  to	  discuss	  political	  and	  military	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  Islamabad,	  this	  was	  déjà	  vu.	  	  In	  1979,	  the	  Soviet	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  compelled	  the	  United	  States	  to	  lift	  its	  sanctions	  on	  Pakistan	  and	  replace	  them	  with	  military	  and	  economic	  aid.	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issues	  in	  a	  frank,	  friendly,	  and	  unofficial	  setting.	  	  These	  informal	  engagements,	  known	  as	  Track	  II	  diplomacy,	  were	  intended	  to	  develop	  and	  debate	  innovative	  solutions	  to	  challenging	  security	  issues.	  The	  Center	  on	  Contemporary	  Conflict	  (CCC)	  at	  the	  U.S.	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School	  was	  established	  in	  2001	  to	  mitigate	  the	  dearth	  of	  functional	  subject-­‐matter	  expertise	  in	  regional	  studies,	  to	  include	  South	  Asia.	  	  The	  CCC	  has	  organized	  numerous	  Track	  II	  dialogues	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  consultations	  with	  regional	  experts	  would	  help	  inform	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  	  Experts	  consulted	  since	  2001	  have	  included	  academics,	  retired	  military	  officials,	  and	  former	  policymakers	  who	  maintain	  links	  with	  their	  respective	  establishments	  and	  could	  potentially	  influence	  their	  thinking.	  	  The	  CCC’s	  Track	  II	  efforts	  pertaining	  to	  South	  Asia	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  “strategic	  stability”	  –	  a	  term	  which	  encompasses	  a	  range	  of	  issues,	  including	  nuclear	  proliferation,	  deterrence	  stability,	  and	  role	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  triggering	  crises	  in	  the	  region.4	  This	  report	  interprets	  the	  past	  decade	  of	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  nuclear	  relations	  through	  an	  overarching	  analysis	  of	  previous	  Track	  II	  dialogues	  with	  U.S.,	  Pakistani,	  and	  Indian	  stakeholders.	  	  It	  provides	  U.S.	  government	  agencies	  and	  research	  organizations	  with	  insight	  on	  the	  strategic	  thought	  process	  in	  Pakistan	  as	  well	  as	  the	  status	  and	  trajectories	  of	  its	  nuclear	  program.	  	  Importantly,	  this	  assessment	  also	  informs	  the	  agendas	  and	  areas	  of	  focus	  for	  future	  Track	  II	  dialogues	  by	  identifying	  discussion	  gaps	  and	  redundancies.	  This	  report	  is	  divided	  into	  three	  sections.	  	  This	  introductory	  section	  provides	  background	  on	  Pakistan’s	  tumultuous	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  States	  from	  1998	  onwards.	  	  It	  also	  discusses	  the	  concept	  of	  Track	  II	  diplomacy,	  explaining	  its	  strengths	  and	  limitations,	  as	  well	  as	  best	  practices.	  	  The	  second	  section	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  survey	  of	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  program,	  as	  commonly	  raised	  on	  the	  Track	  II	  circuit.	  	  Four	  subjects	  are	  examined	  in	  detail:	  	  nuclear	  proliferation,	  nuclear	  stability,	  nuclear	  security	  and	  safety,	  and	  nuclear	  energy.	  	  The	  third	  and	  final	  section	  of	  this	  report	  charts	  a	  way	  forward	  for	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  nuclear	  relations	  and	  recommends	  changes	  to	  improve	  the	  Track	  II	  process	  with	  Pakistan.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  CCC	  is	  not	  the	  only	  performer	  that	  convenes	  Track	  II	  meetings	  between	  Americans	  and	  Pakistanis.	  	  Other	  performers	  with	  whom	  the	  authors	  of	  this	  report	  have	  interacted	  include	  the	  Hoover	  Institution	  and	  Center	  on	  International	  Security	  and	  Cooperation	  at	  Stanford	  University,	  the	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace,	  the	  Henry	  L.	  Stimson	  Center,	  the	  University	  of	  Ottawa,	  and	  the	  Center	  for	  Global	  Security	  Research	  at	  Lawrence	  Livermore	  National	  Laboratory.	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Overview	  of	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  Relations	  One	  of	  the	  key	  purposes	  of	  engaging	  Pakistani	  security	  experts	  in	  the	  Track	  II	  process	  has	  been	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  South	  Asia’s	  strategic	  dynamics	  in	  an	  era	  when	  the	  region	  has	  been	  central	  to	  U.S.	  security	  policy.	  	  After	  September	  11,	  2001,	  the	  Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan	  borderlands	  became	  the	  epicenter	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism.	  	  Strategic	  cooperation	  with	  Pakistan	  was	  deemed	  indispensable	  to	  the	  war	  effort	  and	  was	  expanded.	  But	  over	  time,	  several	  irritants	  chilled	  the	  bilateral	  relationship,	  including	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  proliferation	  scandal,	  the	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  nuclear	  deal,	  questions	  over	  Pakistan’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism,	  and	  sovereignty	  concerns	  stemming	  from	  drone	  strikes.	  	  Today,	  the	  relationship	  between	  Washington	  and	  Islamabad	  remains	  functional,	  but	  as	  the	  United	  States	  rebalances	  to	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  and	  deepens	  its	  partnership	  with	  India,	  Pakistanis	  fear	  they	  are	  increasingly	  peripheral	  to	  U.S.	  interests.	  	  In	  reality,	  Pakistan’s	  geopolitical	  relevance	  in	  the	  coming	  decades	  is	  unlikely	  to	  diminish	  due	  to	  its	  proximity	  to	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iran,	  rivalry	  with	  India,	  and	  friendship	  with	  China.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  enduring	  interests	  in	  nuclear	  nonproliferation	  and	  stability	  in	  South	  Asia,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  security	  and	  safety	  of	  Pakistan’s	  military	  and	  civilian	  nuclear	  programs.	  	  The	  past	  15	  years	  have	  been	  an	  acutely	  volatile	  time	  for	  Pakistan.	  	  The	  1998	  nuclear	  tests	  incurred	  a	  round	  of	  economically	  damaging	  sanctions	  from	  Washington.	  	  Sanctions	  were	  lifted	  in	  early	  2001,	  but	  Pakistan	  then	  became	  embroiled	  in	  the	  geopolitical	  maelstrom	  of	  9/11.	  	  After	  Operation	  Enduring	  Freedom	  was	  launched	  in	  October	  2001,	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  and	  Taliban	  militants	  fled	  to	  Pakistan’s	  western	  borderlands	  and	  spread	  deep	  inside	  the	  country.	  	  India,	  meanwhile,	  continued	  to	  augment	  its	  conventional	  military	  superiority	  over	  Pakistan,	  and	  several	  crises	  brought	  the	  pair	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  war.	  	  In	  2001,	  Pakistan-­‐based	  extremists	  attacked	  the	  Indian	  parliament	  building	  in	  New	  Delhi,	  raising	  military	  tensions	  and	  prompting	  a	  10-­‐month	  standoff	  along	  the	  international	  border.	  	  Another	  crisis	  occurred	  after	  the	  2008	  terror	  attack	  in	  Mumbai,	  again	  linked	  to	  Pakistan-­‐based	  militants.	  	  Internal	  political	  harmony	  has	  also	  proven	  elusive	  for	  Pakistan	  throughout	  this	  period,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  2007	  Lawyers’	  Movement,	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Tehrik-­‐i-­‐Taliban	  Pakistan,	  suicide	  terrorism,	  and	  the	  secessionist	  movement	  in	  Baluchistan.	  	  In	  sum,	  Pakistan	  is	  beset	  by	  security	  problems	  from	  all	  sides	  and	  within.	  As	  Pakistan	  coped	  with	  mounting	  internal	  and	  external	  threats,	  several	  irritants	  began	  to	  plague	  the	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  bilateral	  relationship.	  	  	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  2004,	  the	  A.Q	  Khan	  proliferation	  network	  was	  busted,	  and	  Pakistan	  found	  itself	  in	  the	  proverbial	  doghouse	  of	  global	  public	  opinion.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  nuclear	  narrative	  in	  South	  Asia	  began	  to	  transform.	  	  
“Pakistan’s	  
geopolitical	  
relevance	  in	  the	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  decades	  
is	  unlikely	  to	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  due	  to	  
its	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  to	  
Afghanistan	  and	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The	  original	  narrative,	  after	  the	  1998	  nuclear	  tests,	  was	  that	  both	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  had	  defied	  the	  international	  nonproliferation	  regime.5	  	  The	  post-­‐A.Q.	  Khan	  narrative,	  however,	  recast	  India	  as	  a	  responsible	  nuclear	  state	  and	  Pakistan	  as	  a	  renegade	  proliferator.	  	  The	  United	  States	  proceeded	  almost	  immediately	  to	  forge	  an	  unprecedented	  nuclear	  relationship	  with	  New	  Delhi	  by	  offering	  a	  civilian	  nuclear	  cooperation	  deal	  in	  2005.	  	  Approved	  by	  Congress	  in	  2008,	  the	  deal	  allows	  India	  to	  import	  nuclear	  fuel	  and	  technology	  despite	  being	  a	  non-­‐signatory	  to	  the	  NPT.	  The	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  nuclear	  deal	  became	  a	  major	  sticking	  point	  in	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  relations	  and	  remains	  so	  to	  this	  day.	  	  From	  a	  Pakistani	  standpoint,	  the	  deal	  is	  discriminatory	  and	  exhibits	  a	  double	  standard.	  	  Pakistanis	  feel	  that	  their	  quest	  for	  nuclear	  deterrence	  was	  no	  different	  than	  India’s,	  thus	  they	  qualify	  for	  a	  nuclear	  deal	  of	  their	  own.	  	  Western	  analysts	  counter	  that	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  network	  has	  tarnished	  Pakistan’s	  nonproliferation	  credibility,	  but	  Pakistanis	  reject	  this.	  	  They	  maintain	  that	  the	  Pakistani	  state	  was	  not	  complicit	  in	  A.Q.	  Khan’s	  network	  and	  should	  not	  be	  held	  liable,	  especially	  since	  Islamabad	  shared	  the	  results	  of	  their	  investigation	  of	  Khan	  with	  the	  international	  community	  and	  took	  steps	  to	  prevent	  the	  network	  from	  recurring.	  	  Pakistanis	  also	  cite	  the	  subsequent	  improvements	  they	  have	  made	  to	  their	  nuclear	  security,	  safety,	  and	  export	  control	  architecture	  –	  improvements	  that	  have	  been	  publicly	  lauded	  by	  Washington	  and	  NGOs	  such	  as	  the	  Nuclear	  Threat	  Initiative.6	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  relations	  truly	  began	  to	  sour	  in	  2006-­‐8	  as	  violence	  in	  Afghanistan	  escalated.	  	  The	  Afghan	  Taliban	  had	  successfully	  regrouped,	  and	  Washington	  grew	  increasingly	  dissatisfied	  with	  Pakistan’s	  cooperation	  in	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism.	  	  The	  common	  Western	  perception	  was	  that	  Pakistan	  was	  not	  “doing	  enough”	  to	  combat	  militancy	  in	  the	  borderlands,	  given	  Islamabad’s	  reluctance	  to	  target	  Afghan	  Taliban	  safe	  havens	  in	  the	  Federally	  Administered	  Tribal	  Areas	  (FATA).	  	  U.S.	  officials	  alleged	  that	  Pakistan	  aimed	  to	  maintain	  good	  relations	  with	  Afghan	  militant	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  Haqqani	  network,	  in	  order	  to	  exert	  indirect	  influence	  over	  the	  future	  direction	  of	  the	  Afghan	  state.7	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  On	  June	  6,	  1998,	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  unanimously	  adopted	  resolution	  1172,	  condemning	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  in	  equal	  terms	  for	  their	  nuclear	  tests	  and	  urging	  them	  to	  halt	  their	  nuclear	  weapons	  programs.	  	  See	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  "Security	  Council	  Condemns	  Nuclear	  Tests	  by	  India	  and	  Pakistan,"	  news	  release,	  June	  6,	  1998,	  http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/sc6528.doc.htm.	  6	  NTI	  Nuclear	  Materials	  Security	  Index,	  129.	  7	  U.S.	  Strategy	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq:	  Hearings	  Before	  the	  Senate	  Armed	  Services	  Committee,	  112th	  Cong.,	  1st	  Sess.	  (2011)	  (statement	  of	  Admiral	  Michael	  Mullen),	  11,	  http://www.armed-­‐services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/11-­‐70%20-­‐%209-­‐22-­‐11.pdf.	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  a	  double	  
standard.”	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Pakistan	  countered	  that	  its	  security	  forces	  were	  being	  pulled	  in	  three	  contradictory	  and	  taxing	  directions	  –	  counterinsurgency	  in	  the	  west,	  defensive	  deployment	  toward	  India	  in	  the	  east,	  and	  counterterrorism	  in	  every	  province.	  	  Pakistanis	  also	  cited	  the	  numerous	  and	  mounting	  casualties	  suffered	  by	  their	  counterinsurgency	  forces	  as	  proof	  of	  their	  commitment	  to	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism.	  	  As	  mutual	  resentment	  grew	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Pakistan,	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  turned	  into	  a	  blame	  game.	  	  The	  U.S.	  strategic	  community	  frequently	  accused	  the	  Pakistani	  military	  and	  intelligence	  apparatus	  of	  double-­‐dealing	  with	  religious	  extremists,	  while	  Pakistanis	  decried	  the	  United	  States’	  strategic	  favoritism	  toward	  India.	  	  	  With	  both	  ideological	  camps	  firmly	  entrenched,	  the	  United	  States	  began	  to	  take	  unilateral	  action.	  	  It	  stalled	  coalition	  support	  funds	  to	  Pakistan;	  U.S.	  intelligence	  contractors	  (e.g.,	  Raymond	  Davis)	  started	  operating	  independently	  within	  Pakistan	  without	  prior	  coordination	  with	  Pakistani	  officials;	  and	  drone	  strikes	  were	  stepped	  up	  in	  Pakistani	  tribal	  areas	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  “Counterterrorism-­‐Plus.”	  	  These	  actions	  inflamed	  public	  uproar	  in	  Pakistan	  and	  raised	  a	  plethora	  of	  sovereignty	  concerns.	  	  Relations	  took	  a	  nosedive	  in	  May	  2011	  after	  the	  unilateral	  U.S.	  military	  operation	  that	  killed	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  in	  Abbottabad.	  	  The	  low-­‐water	  mark	  of	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  relations	  occurred	  six	  months	  later,	  when	  NATO	  forces	  mistakenly	  attacked	  a	  Pakistani	  checkpoint	  at	  the	  Salala	  ridge	  on	  the	  Pakistan-­‐Afghanistan	  border,	  killing	  24	  Pakistani	  soldiers.	  	  To	  a	  large	  extent,	  the	  past	  two	  years	  have	  helped	  repair	  the	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  relationship.	  	  The	  year	  2013	  was	  a	  good	  one	  in	  that	  it	  was	  crisis-­‐free.	  	  Pakistan	  underwent	  a	  successful	  democratic	  transition,	  relations	  with	  India	  thawed	  somewhat	  as	  bilateral	  trade	  expanded,	  and	  the	  official	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  strategic	  dialogue	  resumed	  after	  a	  three-­‐year	  hiatus.8	  	  Although	  drone	  strikes	  continue	  and	  many	  prominent	  Pakistani	  politicians	  remain	  vehemently	  opposed,	  the	  frequency	  of	  drone	  strikes	  appears	  to	  have	  decreased	  in	  the	  past	  year.9	  	  Moving	  forward,	  however,	  Washington’s	  shifting	  strategic	  priorities	  have	  imbued	  the	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  relationship	  with	  uncertainty.	  	  Islamabad	  relies	  heavily	  on	  U.S.	  aid	  and	  fears	  that	  the	  rebalance	  to	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific,	  drawdown	  from	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Washington’s	  diplomatic	  overtures	  to	  New	  Delhi	  are	  signs	  that	  Pakistan	  may	  soon	  be	  “abandoned.”	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State,	  "U.S.-­‐Pakistan	  Strategic	  Dialogue,"	  http://www.state.gov/p/sca/ci/pk/strategicdialogue/index.htm.	  9	  Lisa	  Schlein,	  "US	  Drone	  Strikes,	  Civilian	  Casualties	  Drop	  in	  Pakistan	  Last	  Year,"	  Voice	  of	  America,	  last	  modified	  March	  12,	  2014,	  http://www.voanews.com/content/us-­‐drone-­‐strikes-­‐civilian-­‐casualties-­‐drop-­‐in-­‐pakistan-­‐last-­‐year/1870012.html.	  
“Islamabad	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and	  fears	  that	  the	  






to	  New	  Delhi	  are	  
signs	  that	  Pakistan	  
may	  soon	  be	  
‘abandoned.’”	  
U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  Nuclear	  Relations:	  A	  Strategic	  Survey	   10	  
Islamabad’s	  fears	  of	  abandonment	  are	  also	  a	  consequence	  of	  its	  complex	  regional	  threat	  environment.	  	  Afghanistan	  is	  a	  volatile	  nest	  of	  instability,	  and	  the	  post-­‐2014	  outlook	  is	  highly	  uncertain.	  	  Meanwhile,	  Islamabad’s	  relationship	  with	  Tehran	  is	  lukewarm	  at	  best,	  and	  India’s	  military	  dominance	  continues	  to	  pose	  a	  threat.	  	  India’s	  nuclear	  ballistic	  missile	  submarine	  Arihant	  has	  reached	  operational	  status,	  aging	  tanks	  are	  being	  replaced	  with	  new	  T-­‐90S,	  126	  Dassault	  Rafale	  fighters	  are	  on	  order,	  and	  new	  cruise	  and	  ballistic	  missiles	  are	  in	  development.	  	  India	  also	  claims	  to	  be	  developing	  ballistic	  missile	  point	  defense	  over	  New	  Delhi	  and	  Mumbai.	  	  To	  hedge	  against	  these	  dangers,	  Pakistan	  has	  deepened	  its	  cooperation	  with	  China,	  which	  is	  providing	  assistance	  in	  nuclear	  power,	  infrastructure,	  and	  military	  R&D.	  	  Pakistan	  has	  also	  doubled-­‐down	  on	  its	  military	  nuclear	  program	  and	  embraced	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons,	  evident	  from	  its	  recent	  flight	  tests	  of	  the	  60	  km-­‐range	  Hatf-­‐9/Nasr.	  Despite	  Pakistani	  fears	  of	  abandonment,	  Pakistan	  will	  remain	  strategically	  relevant	  to	  the	  United	  States	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future	  due	  to	  the	  pervasive	  nuclear	  risk	  in	  South	  Asia.	  	  The	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  rivalry	  remains	  unresolved,	  arsenals	  are	  expanding	  rapidly,	  and	  Pakistan	  continues	  to	  grapple	  with	  rising	  domestic	  extremism.	  	  Strategic	  relevance,	  however,	  does	  not	  automatically	  equate	  to	  strong	  bilateral	  relations.	  	  Balance-­‐of-­‐power	  calculations	  are	  driving	  a	  wedge	  between	  Washington	  and	  Islamabad	  as	  the	  U.S.	  rebalances	  to	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific.	  	  Two	  power	  dyads	  seem	  to	  be	  emerging:	  	  China	  and	  Pakistan	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  India	  and	  the	  United	  States	  on	  the	  other.	  	  Yet	  Pakistan’s	  convergence	  with	  Beijing	  is	  not	  a	  replacement	  for	  its	  relationship	  with	  Washington.	  	  For	  political,	  economic,	  and	  strategic	  succor,	  Pakistan	  remains	  dependent	  on	  the	  United	  States.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  Pakistan	  will	  be	  forced	  to	  make	  tough	  choices	  regarding	  its	  policy	  with	  its	  four	  regional	  neighbors	  –	  China,	  India,	  Afghanistan,	  and	  Iran	  –	  and	  calibrate	  its	  security	  and	  economic	  policies	  to	  retain	  a	  functional	  rapport	  with	  Washington.	  If	  the	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  bilateral	  relationship	  is	  to	  advance	  beyond	  mere	  functionality,	  however,	  both	  sides	  must	  overcome	  their	  persistent	  dissension	  over	  nuclear	  issues.	  The	  United	  States	  remains	  skeptical	  of	  Islamabad’s	  role	  in	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  network	  and	  is	  unwilling	  to	  grant	  a	  Pakistan	  a	  nuclear	  deal	  on	  par	  with	  India.	  	  Pakistan,	  meanwhile,	  denies	  complicity	  in	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  network	  and	  argues	  it	  has	  proven	  itself	  as	  a	  responsible	  nuclear	  power.	  	  Pakistanis	  contend	  that	  Washington’s	  reluctance	  to	  normalize	  its	  nuclear	  relationship	  with	  Pakistan	  is	  tantamount	  to	  discrimination.	  	  The	  consequences	  of	  this	  diplomatic	  impasse	  are	  not	  just	  rhetorical.	  	  Pakistan	  has	  blocked	  the	  Fissile	  Material	  Cutoff	  Treaty	  and	  is	  amplifying	  its	  fissile	  material	  production	  capacity	  with	  the	  Shanawa	  uranium	  mine	  in	  Khyber	  Pakhtunkhwa	  province	  and	  a	  fourth	  plutonium	  production	  reactor	  at	  the	  Khushab	  nuclear	  complex.	  	  Until	  a	  diplomatic	  breakthrough	  occurs,	  nuclear	  competition	  will	  proceed	  unabated	  on	  the	  subcontinent.	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Overview	  of	  Track	  II	  Diplomacy	  Track	  II	  diplomacy	  is	  defined	  as	  “a	  mechanism	  to	  bring	  together	  people	  from	  different	  sides	  of	  a	  conflict	  to	  talk	  about	  issues	  and	  try	  to	  develop	  new	  ideas,”	  typically	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  an	  academic	  conference	  or	  workshop.10	  	  In	  the	  Pakistan	  context,	  Track	  II	  typically	  convenes	  recently-­‐retired	  U.S.	  and	  Pakistani	  government	  officials	  (civilian	  and	  military)	  and	  some	  academics	  to	  discuss	  timely	  subjects	  of	  mutual	  interest,	  such	  as	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  nuclear	  stability.	  	  Trilateral	  meetings	  involving	  Indian	  stakeholders	  are	  also	  common.	  	  Oftentimes,	  an	  after-­‐action	  report	  is	  published	  that	  summarizes	  and	  analyzes	  the	  discussions	  for	  public	  consumption.	  Track	  II	  meetings	  are	  inherently	  unofficial	  and	  therefore	  stand	  in	  contrast	  to	  Track	  I.	  	  The	  latter	  involves	  official	  diplomatic	  meetings	  between	  state	  delegations	  or	  representatives.	  	  During	  official	  meetings,	  dignitaries	  are	  constrained	  by	  their	  respective	  governments’	  official	  positions	  on	  matters.	  	  Entrenched	  viewpoints	  therefore	  tend	  to	  dominate	  the	  discourse,	  while	  innovative	  problem-­‐solving	  and	  outside-­‐the-­‐box	  thinking	  proceed	  at	  a	  glacial	  pace.	  	  This	  dynamic	  often	  puts	  U.S.	  and	  Pakistani	  diplomats	  at	  loggerheads,	  promoting	  the	  status	  quo.	  Track	  II	  is	  meant	  to	  circumvent	  the	  “red	  tape	  of	  conventional	  diplomacy”	  and	  generate	  innovative	  policy	  solutions	  to	  international	  disputes	  and	  security	  issues.11	  	  The	  hope	  is	  that	  these	  policy	  ideas	  subsequently	  filter	  back	  to	  the	  governments	  and	  break	  the	  Track	  I	  gridlock.	  	  If	  this	  is	  to	  occur,	  the	  ideas	  must	  be	  credible,	  well-­‐reasoned,	  and	  come	  from	  trusted	  voices.	  	  Participant	  selection	  is	  therefore	  critical	  to	  the	  success	  of	  a	  Track	  II	  event.	  	  When	  selecting	  participants	  for	  a	  Track	  II	  workshop,	  it	  is	  generally	  desirable	  to	  invite	  former	  (retired)	  government	  officials	  with	  considerable	  experience.	  	  Retired	  senior	  officials	  are	  no	  longer	  beholden	  to	  establishment	  rigidity,	  dogma,	  and	  groupthink	  dynamics,	  yet	  are	  credible,	  respected,	  and	  remain	  “close	  to	  the	  official	  agenda.”12	  	  The	  location	  of	  Track	  II	  meetings	  also	  influences	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  discussions.	  	  Holding	  a	  dialogue	  in-­‐country	  maximizes	  local	  participation,	  but	  the	  contributors	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  guarded	  in	  their	  opinions	  and	  resort	  to	  populism	  and	  national	  rhetoric.	  	  In	  contrast,	  meeting	  in	  a	  neutral,	  non-­‐government	  location	  abroad	  promotes	  candor	  and	  allows	  contentious	  issues	  to	  be	  discussed	  more	  freely.	  	  Many	  Track	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Peter	  Jones,	  "Track-­‐two	  Diplomacy,"	  Dawn	  (Pakistan),	  February	  10,	  2013,	  http://www.dawn.com/news/785059/track-­‐two-­‐diplomacy.	  11	  Ibid.	  12	  Ibid.	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IIs	  with	  Pakistan	  have	  selected	  overseas	  venues	  owing	  also	  to	  the	  country’s	  security	  situation.13	  It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasize	  –	  especially	  for	  South	  Asian	  Track	  IIs	  –	  that	  these	  discussions	  do	  not	  produce	  a	  monumental	  transformation	  in	  official	  diplomatic	  postures	  overnight.	  	  Track	  II	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  sustained	  endeavor	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  one-­‐and-­‐done	  symposium.	  	  Over	  a	  span	  of	  time	  and	  multiple	  Track	  II	  meetings,	  a	  nascent	  policy	  idea	  begins	  to	  develop	  and	  matures	  gradually,	  gaining	  legitimacy	  as	  it	  is	  deliberated	  and	  refined.	  	  With	  the	  passage	  of	  time,	  these	  ideas	  permeate	  the	  national	  strategic	  discourse	  and	  may	  even	  obtain	  buy-­‐in	  from	  establishment	  elites.	  	  Even	  when	  government	  policymakers	  fail	  to	  embrace	  Track	  II	  policy	  recommendations,	  Track	  II	  meetings	  remain	  a	  highly	  useful	  tool	  because	  they	  yield	  valuable	  insight	  into	  a	  country’s	  strategic	  thinking	  and	  domestic	  political	  nuances.14	  	  Track	  II	  also	  forges	  lasting	  people-­‐to-­‐people	  contacts.	  	  Participants	  are	  able	  to	  network	  and	  continue	  debating	  and	  developing	  ideas	  with	  one	  another	  long	  after	  the	  meeting	  is	  adjourned.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  Track	  II	  serves	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  informal	  public	  diplomacy.	  Track	  II	  suffers	  from	  limitations,	  as	  well.	  	  Despite	  the	  strictly	  unofficial	  nature	  of	  Track	  II,	  retired	  government	  officials	  are	  often	  reluctant	  to	  buck	  the	  establishment	  narrative	  out	  of	  fear	  of	  reprisal	  or	  political	  marginalization.	  	  Although	  the	  Chatham	  House	  rule	  of	  comment	  non-­‐attribution	  does	  protect	  participants	  from	  this	  sort	  of	  reprisal,	  it	  is	  only	  effective	  if	  the	  participants	  actually	  abide	  by	  it.	  	  Another	  drawback	  of	  Track	  II	  is	  that	  serving	  bureaucrats	  are	  often	  unwilling	  to	  “cede	  ground	  to	  non-­‐officials”	  by	  adopting	  Track	  II	  policy	  recommendations15;	  alternatively,	  serving	  bureaucrats	  may	  seek	  to	  influence	  the	  discourse	  of	  a	  workshop	  by	  coaching	  invitees	  to	  parrot	  the	  official	  narrative.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  Track	  II	  occasionally	  becomes	  a	  battleground	  for	  a	  narrative	  war.	  	  The	  narrative	  war	  phenomenon	  has	  affected	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  Track	  II	  dialogues	  in	  the	  past,	  as	  well	  as	  India-­‐Pakistan	  dialogues.	  	  Participants	  may	  feel	  pressured	  to	  present	  a	  unified	  message	  on	  their	  respective	  country’s	  nuclear	  program	  and	  deterrence	  philosophy,	  which	  can	  deadlock	  the	  discourse.	  	  It	  becomes	  incumbent	  upon	  the	  dialogue	  organizer	  to	  put	  the	  participants	  back	  on	  track	  and	  steer	  the	  debate	  to	  meet	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  event.	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  hold	  the	  meeting	  in	  a	  neutral	  location	  overseas	  because	  it	  allows	  the	  participants	  to	  escape	  the	  “gravitational	  pull”	  of	  their	  respective	  establishments.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  The	  last	  in-­‐country	  Track	  II	  dialogue	  organized	  by	  the	  CCC	  was	  in	  2007,	  in	  partnership	  with	  Pakistan’s	  National	  Defence	  University.	  	  Since	  then,	  the	  security	  situation	  has	  not	  permitted	  a	  subsequent	  in-­‐country	  event.	  	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace	  and	  the	  Henry	  L.	  Stimson	  Center	  has	  convened	  some	  Track	  IIs	  in	  Islamabad.	  14	  Although	  a	  country’s	  strategic	  thinking	  may	  appear	  as	  a	  black	  box	  to	  an	  outside	  observer,	  one	  way	  to	  determine	  the	  impact	  of	  Track	  II	  dialogues	  on	  a	  country’s	  national	  strategic	  discourse	  is	  to	  engage	  with	  local	  think	  tanks	  through	  interviews	  and	  briefings,	  as	  appropriate.	  	  For	  Pakistan,	  key	  think	  tanks	  with	  which	  the	  authors	  have	  interacted	  include	  the	  Centre	  for	  International	  Strategic	  Studies,	  Institute	  of	  Strategic	  Studies	  Islamabad,	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Defence	  and	  Strategic	  Studies	  at	  Quaid-­‐e-­‐Azam	  University.	  15	  Peter	  Jones,	  presentation	  at	  Jinnah	  Institute	  roundtable,	  "Interrupted	  &	  Interruptible:	  Does	  Track	  II	  Work	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pakistan	  Dialogue	  Process?"	  (Islamabad,	  Pakistan,	  December	  10,	  2014).	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One	  final	  drawback	  of	  Track	  II	  is	  redundancy.	  	  Because	  there	  is	  no	  centralized	  Track	  II	  coordinating	  body,	  overlapping	  Track	  II	  efforts	  are	  frequently	  held	  by	  a	  multitude	  of	  sponsors.	  	  Unity	  of	  effort	  is	  elusive,	  if	  not	  impossible.	  	  Yet	  this	  “bug”	  can	  easily	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  Track	  II.	  	  If	  Track	  II	  meetings	  help	  to	  grease	  the	  wheels	  of	  official	  diplomacy,	  overabundance	  may	  be	  preferable	  to	  scarcity.	  There	  are	  numerous	  models	  –	  or	  methodologies	  –	  for	  developing	  a	  Track	  II	  event.	  	  A	  frequent	  model	  is	  the	  traditional	  academic	  conference	  with	  commissioned	  papers	  from	  the	  participants.	  	  Another	  model	  is	  the	  more	  informal	  workshop	  in	  which	  the	  performer	  develops	  and	  distributes	  a	  concept	  paper	  to	  the	  participants	  that	  presents	  them	  with	  various	  discussion	  prompts.	  	  Table-­‐top	  exercises	  (e.g.,	  war-­‐games)	  are	  a	  more	  interactive	  participation	  model,	  but	  they	  are	  more	  apt	  for	  exploring	  crisis	  response	  and	  management	  dynamics	  (e.g.,	  how	  might	  Pakistan	  react	  to	  a	  limited	  Indian	  military	  operation	  across	  the	  Line	  of	  Control	  in	  Kashmir)	  as	  opposed	  to	  political	  and	  economic	  issues	  (e.g.,	  how	  can	  economic	  development	  allay	  extremism	  in	  Pakistan?).	  Participant	  selection	  is	  a	  key	  methodological	  component	  of	  a	  Track	  II	  event	  because	  the	  participant	  makeup	  can	  influence	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  findings	  and	  feasibility	  of	  any	  policy	  recommendations.	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  newly-­‐retired	  government	  officials	  have	  the	  most	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  information	  and	  the	  most	  influence	  over	  their	  respective	  governments,	  but	  invariably,	  they	  are	  reluctant	  to	  be	  candid	  owing	  to	  their	  inexperience	  at	  the	  Track	  II	  level.	  	  Although	  veteran	  Track	  II	  participants	  have	  been	  out	  of	  the	  establishment	  loop	  for	  a	  longer	  period	  and	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  “linked-­‐in”	  with	  their	  respective	  policymaking	  community,	  these	  participants	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  give	  frank	  and	  innovative	  viewpoints.	  	  Participant	  selection	  is	  therefore	  a	  nuanced	  tradeoff.	  It	  is	  usually	  best	  to	  strike	  a	  balanced	  mix	  between	  new	  and	  veteran	  participants.	  	  New	  participants	  are	  rotational	  and	  intermittent,	  whereas	  veteran	  participants	  comprise	  a	  “core	  group”	  that	  is	  frequently	  invited	  to	  attend	  Track	  II	  meetings.	  	  The	  advantage	  of	  this	  binary	  formulation	  is	  that	  the	  freshman	  participants	  contribute	  novel	  ideas,	  and	  over	  the	  course	  of	  subsequent	  Track	  II	  meetings,	  the	  most	  promising	  of	  these	  ideas	  gain	  traction	  and	  continue	  to	  be	  deliberated	  and	  developed	  by	  the	  veteran	  participants.	  	  Veteran	  participants	  therefore	  comprise	  an	  important	  institutional	  memory	  that	  spans	  across	  multiple	  Track	  II	  dialogues	  in	  multiple	  venues.	  Although	  Track	  II	  is	  innately	  unofficial,	  it	  is	  often	  appropriate	  and	  helpful	  to	  invite	  current	  government	  officials	  to	  Track	  II	  events	  as	  observers.	  	  In	  the	  past,	  many	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  Track	  IIs	  have	  hosted	  officials	  from	  the	  Strategic	  Plans	  Division	  –	  the	  entity	  responsible	  for	  the	  
“If	  Track	  II	  meetings	  
help	  to	  grease	  the	  
wheels	  of	  official	  
diplomacy,	  
overabundance	  may	  
be	  preferable	  to	  
scarcity.”	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security,	  maintenance,	  force	  planning,	  and	  operational	  control	  of	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  Track	  II	  meetings	  that	  include	  some	  form	  of	  government	  participation	  are	  informally	  distinguished	  as	  “Track	  1.5.”	  	  The	  upside	  of	  having	  official	  observers	  is	  that	  they	  are	  exposed	  to	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  expert	  analysis,	  which	  helps	  diffuse	  policy	  recommendations	  from	  Track	  II	  to	  Track	  I.	  	  Officials	  are	  also	  able	  to	  chime	  in	  and	  correct	  any	  misconceptions	  about	  establishment	  policy	  that	  emerge	  during	  the	  discussions.	  	  The	  downside	  of	  official	  attendance	  is	  that	  it	  can	  inhibit	  the	  candor	  and	  open	  expression	  of	  unconventional	  viewpoints.16	  	  Timing	  can	  also	  impact	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  Track	  II	  event.	  	  If	  a	  talk	  is	  held	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  a	  crisis	  or	  during	  acute	  tensions,	  tempers	  may	  run	  high	  and	  participants	  may	  be	  unwilling	  to	  buck	  the	  establishment	  line.	  	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  Track	  II	  dialogues	  held	  in	  2011,	  for	  instance,	  were	  notably	  tense	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  series	  of	  incidents,	  including	  the	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  raid	  and	  the	  friendly-­‐fire	  incident	  in	  Salala.	  Track	  II	  meetings	  are	  typically	  the	  most	  successful	  when	  they	  are	  narrowly	  scoped	  as	  opposed	  to	  addressing	  a	  broad	  subject.	  	  Meetings	  related	  to	  the	  strategic	  implications	  of	  new	  weapons	  systems	  and	  doctrines,	  for	  example,	  are	  much	  more	  focused	  and	  facilitate	  fruitful	  professional	  and	  technical	  discussions,	  as	  opposed	  to	  generalized	  topics	  where	  emotions	  and	  politics	  tend	  to	  run	  high.	  	  Narrowly	  scoped	  meetings	  have	  proven	  highly	  successful,	  yielding	  insightful	  discourse	  on	  strategic	  and	  operational	  matters	  among	  experts.	  A	  number	  of	  entities	  are	  executing	  Track	  II	  research	  endeavors	  on	  South	  Asia.	  	  Performers	  include	  the	  Center	  on	  Contemporary	  Conflict	  at	  the	  U.S.	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School,	  the	  University	  of	  Ottawa,	  the	  Hoover	  Institution	  and	  Center	  for	  International	  Security	  and	  Cooperation	  at	  Stanford	  University,	  the	  Henry	  L.	  Stimson	  Center,	  the	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	  Peace,	  and	  the	  Center	  for	  Global	  Security	  Research	  at	  Lawrence	  Livermore	  National	  Laboratory.	  	  This	  report	  draws	  its	  conclusions	  from	  over	  a	  decade	  of	  Track	  II	  initiatives	  executed	  by	  the	  abovementioned	  performers.	  	  In	  cases	  where	  the	  authors	  of	  this	  report	  were	  not	  they	  themselves	  the	  organizers,	  they	  were	  participants	  and/or	  received	  formal	  or	  informal	  after-­‐action	  reports.	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Since	  2011,	  the	  Strategic	  Plans	  Division	  (SPD)	  has	  generally	  declined	  to	  send	  observers	  to	  Track	  II	  events.	  	  The	  precise	  reasons	  are	  unknown,	  but	  potential	  factors	  include	  the	  2011	  nosedive	  in	  U.S.-­‐Pakistan	  relations	  and	  a	  growing	  organizational	  skepticism	  in	  Pakistan	  that	  Track	  II	  has	  become	  a	  venue	  for	  criticizing	  Pakistan	  and	  its	  nuclear	  program.	  	  Controversial	  publications	  by	  U.S.-­‐based	  journalists	  (for	  example,	  Marc	  Ambinder	  and	  Jeffrey	  Goldberg’s	  "The	  Ally	  from	  Hell,"	  published	  in	  The	  Atlantic	  in	  October	  2011)	  also	  fueled	  negative	  perceptions	  in	  Pakistan.	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NUCLEAR ISSUE AREAS For	  the	  past	  40	  years,	  nuclear	  issues	  have	  been	  a	  consistent	  thread	  in	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  relations.	  	  Throughout	  this	  period,	  U.S.	  policy	  has	  shifted	  gears	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  South	  Asia’s	  dynamic	  nuclear	  environment.	  	  From	  the	  early	  1970s	  to	  the	  1998	  nuclear	  tests,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  nuclear	  nonproliferation,	  including	  enforcement	  of	  the	  NPT.	  	  After	  Pakistan’s	  and	  India’s	  1998	  nuclear	  tests,	  the	  United	  States	  focused	  its	  efforts	  toward	  ensuring	  stability	  and	  strategic	  restraint	  in	  South	  Asia	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  preventing	  the	  outbreak	  of	  nuclear	  war.	  	  Post-­‐9/11,	  the	  specter	  of	  terrorism	  and	  extremism	  in	  Pakistan	  prompted	  the	  United	  States	  to	  focus	  on	  nuclear	  security	  and	  safety,	  which	  continues	  to	  this	  day,	  especially	  as	  Pakistan	  seeks	  to	  expand	  its	  nuclear	  energy	  infrastructure.	  	  The	  following	  sections	  draw	  from	  a	  decade	  of	  Track	  II	  discourse	  to	  survey	  the	  current	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  Pakistan	  for	  each	  of	  these	  four	  nuclear	  policy	  issue	  areas	  –	  proliferation,	  stability,	  security	  and	  safety,	  and	  energy.	  	  
Nuclear	  Proliferation	  In	  1974,	  India	  tested	  a	  nuclear	  device	  in	  an	  operation	  code-­‐named	  “Smiling	  Buddha.”	  	  Given	  Pakistan’s	  history	  of	  tensions	  and	  war	  with	  its	  eastern	  neighbor,	  this	  seminal	  event	  compelled	  Islamabad	  to	  begin	  its	  own	  nuclear	  weapons	  program.	  	  Over	  the	  next	  25	  years,	  the	  United	  States	  applied	  several	  policy	  tools,	  including	  sanctions,	  in	  order	  to	  dissuade	  Pakistan	  from	  developing	  the	  bomb.	  	  These	  efforts	  ultimately	  proved	  unsuccessful	  in	  1998	  when	  Pakistan	  (and	  India)	  conducted	  test	  explosions,	  heralding	  the	  start	  of	  the	  overt	  nuclear	  era	  in	  South	  Asia.	  Today,	  proliferation	  remains	  a	  U.S.	  policy	  concern	  in	  South	  Asia	  despite	  the	  failure	  to	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  the	  region,	  and	  proliferation	  issues	  are	  frequently	  raised	  in	  Track	  II	  meetings	  with	  the	  Pakistanis.	  	  Pakistan	  continues	  to	  suffer	  reproach	  as	  a	  horizontal	  proliferator	  given	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  network.	  	  There	  is	  also	  widespread	  concern	  over	  vertical	  proliferation	  in	  Pakistan,	  given	  the	  increase	  in	  fissile	  material	  output	  and	  the	  rapid	  induction	  of	  new	  delivery	  systems.	  	  While	  Pakistan	  has	  somewhat	  mitigated	  horizontal	  proliferation	  concerns	  by	  emulating	  the	  export	  control	  practices	  of	  the	  Nuclear	  Suppliers	  Group,	  Missile	  Technology	  Control	  Regime,	  and	  Australia	  Group,	  curtailing	  vertical	  proliferation	  	  has	  remained	  a	  challenge,	  and	  Pakistan	  remains	  opposed	  to	  the	  Fissile	  Material	  Cutoff	  Treaty.	  Pakistanis,	  however,	  chafe	  at	  U.S.	  nonproliferation	  scrutiny.	  	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  United	  States	  lost	  its	  nonproliferation	  credibility	  by	  extending	  the	  2005	  nuclear	  deal	  to	  New	  Delhi	  and	  failing	  to	  engage	  Islamabad,	  a	  fellow	  NPT	  non-­‐signatory,	  on	  equitable	  terms.	  	  Pakistanis	  also	  accuse	  the	  United	  States	  of	  nuclear	  duplicity;	  whereas	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	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weapons	  program	  is	  viewed	  with	  alarm	  in	  Washington,	  India’s	  new	  intermediate-­‐range	  nuclear	  forces	  (Agni-­‐V	  and	  K-­‐series	  missiles)	  are	  tacitly	  condoned.	  	  In	  short,	  Pakistanis	  interpret	  U.S.	  conduct	  as	  a	  form	  of	  nuclear	  “discrimination.”	  	  Western	  commentators	  reason	  that	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  affair	  has	  spoiled	  the	  prospects	  for	  a	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  deal,	  but	  Pakistanis	  contend	  that	  the	  government	  should	  not	  be	  held	  responsible	  because	  it	  was	  not	  complicit	  in	  Khan’s	  network	  and	  made	  a	  genuine	  effort	  to	  investigate	  him	  after	  he	  was	  caught.	  	  	  	  
Horizontal	  Proliferation	  
	  Horizontal	  proliferation	  refers	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  nuclear	  weapons	  or	  technologies	  to	  states	  that	  previously	  did	  not	  have	  them.	  	  This	  has	  been	  an	  enduring	  concern	  of	  the	  United	  States	  since	  the	  dawn	  of	  the	  nuclear	  age.	  	  Starting	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  the	  United	  States	  sought	  to	  control	  proliferation	  on	  its	  own	  terms	  through	  the	  Atoms	  for	  Peace	  initiative,	  but	  India’s	  1974	  nuclear	  test	  changed	  Washington’s	  idyllic	  approach	  and	  aggravated	  Pakistani	  anxieties.	  	  Pakistan	  saw	  that	  India	  did	  not	  suffer	  major	  repercussions	  for	  its	  nuclear	  gambit	  and	  decided	  to	  follow	  suit	  by	  developing	  its	  own	  nuclear	  program.	  	  In	  1976,	  Pakistan	  commenced	  a	  uranium	  enrichment	  program	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  Dutch-­‐trained	  metallurgist	  Abdul	  Qadeer	  (A.Q.)	  Khan.	  	  Khan	  began	  to	  procure	  centrifuge	  components	  from	  the	  suppliers	  of	  the	  nuclear	  fuel	  company	  URENCO,	  and	  over	  time,	  he	  established	  a	  proliferation	  syndicate	  of	  international	  businessmen	  involved	  in	  dual-­‐use	  technologies.	  	  As	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  program	  matured,	  Khan	  began	  to	  export	  nuclear	  components	  abroad.	  	  The	  syndicate	  was	  eventually	  busted	  in	  2004	  after	  having	  proliferated	  nuclear	  technologies	  to	  Libya,	  North	  Korea,	  and	  Iran.	  	  Although	  a	  decade	  has	  passed	  since	  the	  network’s	  unraveling,	  the	  legacy	  of	  A.Q.	  Khan	  continues	  to	  cast	  a	  shadow	  on	  Pakistan’s	  proliferation	  reputation.	  Before	  the	  exposure	  of	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  network	  in	  2004,	  relations	  between	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  United	  States	  were	  on	  the	  upswing.	  	  Pakistan	  had	  become	  an	  important	  strategic	  partner	  of	  the	  United	  States	  –	  practically	  overnight	  after	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  and	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism.	  	  After	  the	  proliferation	  syndicate	  came	  to	  light,	  Pakistan	  took	  significant	  steps	  to	  limit	  the	  damage	  it	  would	  inflict	  on	  the	  bilateral	  relationship.	  	  Pakistan	  dismantled	  the	  domestic	  component	  of	  the	  international	  syndicate,	  shared	  interrogation	  findings	  from	  A.Q.	  Khan	  and	  his	  accomplices	  with	  the	  international	  community,	  and	  resolutely	  denied	  official	  complicity	  in	  Khan’s	  illicit	  dealings.	  	  As	  Pakistan	  sought	  to	  control	  the	  diplomatic	  fallout,	  Khan	  was	  hailed	  as	  a	  national	  hero	  in	  Pakistan.	  	  President	  Pervez	  Musharraf	  was	  therefore	  unable	  to	  prosecute	  Khan	  and	  instead	  elicited	  a	  public	  confession	  before	  pardoning	  him.	  	  In	  this	  manner,	  Musharraf	  sought	  to	  temper	  the	  international	  outcry	  while	  avoiding	  a	  domestic	  backlash.	  
U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  Nuclear	  Relations:	  A	  Strategic	  Survey	   17	  
Publicly,	  the	  U.S.	  reaction	  to	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  network	  was	  relatively	  muted.	  	  Given	  Pakistan’s	  status	  as	  a	  strategic	  anchor	  in	  a	  volatile	  region,	  it	  was	  more	  valuable	  for	  Washington	  to	  maintain	  a	  positive	  rapport	  than	  to	  allow	  the	  scandal	  to	  spoil	  the	  relationship.	  	  In	  essence,	  the	  expediency	  of	  immediate	  national	  security	  and	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism	  overshadowed	  nonproliferation	  ideals.	  	  Imagine,	  however,	  if	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  revelations	  had	  broken	  in	  2011,	  when	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  relations	  were	  at	  a	  low	  point.	  	  It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  have	  been	  as	  willing	  to	  downplay	  the	  scandal,	  and	  there	  would	  certainly	  have	  been	  intense	  pressure	  from	  Congress	  for	  punitive	  measures.	  	  Counterfactuals	  aside,	  Washington	  agreed	  to	  put	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  debacle	  on	  the	  back	  burner	  but	  has	  not	  forgotten.	  	  Today,	  Pakistanis	  on	  the	  Track	  II	  circuit	  resent	  the	  long	  shadow	  of	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  affair.	  	  They	  contend	  that	  the	  proliferation	  network	  was	  a	  consortium	  of	  international	  businessmen	  over	  which	  A.Q.	  Khan	  lacked	  unitary	  control.	  	  They	  continue	  to	  stress	  that	  the	  Pakistani	  state	  was	  not	  complicit	  in	  the	  proliferation	  ring	  and	  highlight	  Pakistan’s	  efforts	  to	  investigate	  A.Q.	  Khan	  as	  proof	  of	  sincerity.	  	  American	  analysts	  remain	  skeptical,	  however,	  citing	  Pakistan’s	  refusal	  to	  submit	  Khan	  to	  external	  interrogators.	  	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  controversy	  has	  been	  endlessly	  debated	  and	  fully	  exhausted.	  	  Americans	  and	  Pakistanis	  do	  not	  see	  eye-­‐to-­‐eye	  on	  this	  topic,	  and	  when	  it	  is	  raised	  on	  the	  Track	  II	  level,	  it	  poisons	  the	  discourse.	  Another	  horizontal	  proliferation	  topic	  that	  is	  occasionally	  raised	  in	  Track	  IIs	  is	  the	  prospect	  of	  Pakistani-­‐Saudi	  nuclear	  cooperation	  or	  extended	  deterrence	  if	  Iran	  obtains	  the	  bomb.	  	  While	  such	  talk	  makes	  for	  a	  sensational	  media	  headline,	  it	  is	  highly	  speculative	  with	  no	  concrete	  basis.	  	  As	  Mark	  Fitzpatrick	  points	  out,	  “…the	  strategic,	  economic,	  and	  diplomatic	  disincentives…	  make	  a	  nuclear	  transfer	  unlikely.”17	  	  Pakistan	  is	  certainly	  reluctant	  to	  make	  another	  mistake	  similar	  to	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  affair,	  and	  as	  far	  as	  external	  threats	  are	  concerned,	  Pakistani	  security	  managers	  remain	  fixated	  on	  India.	  	  Still,	  the	  strategic	  dynamics	  in	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  are	  fluid,	  and	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  U.S.-­‐Iranian	  rapprochement,	  regional	  security	  calculations	  may	  evolve	  in	  the	  coming	  years.	  	  
Vertical	  Proliferation	  
	  Nuclear	  arsenals	  in	  South	  Asia	  are	  growing	  rapidly	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  publicly	  subscribe	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  credible	  minimum	  deterrence.	  	  Since	  2000,	  Pakistan	  alone	  has	  fielded	  six	  new	  nuclear-­‐capable	  missiles,	  including	  the	  Hatf-­‐3/Ghaznavi,	  Hatf-­‐7/Babur,	  and	  Hatf-­‐8/Ra’ad.	  	  The	  latest	  is	  the	  Hatf-­‐9/Nasr	  SRBM,	  a	  system	  designed	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Mark	  Fitzpatrick,	  Overcoming	  Pakistan's	  Nuclear	  Dangers	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2014),	  158.	  
“Given	  Pakistan’s	  
status	  as	  a	  strategic	  
anchor	  in	  a	  volatile	  
region,	  it	  was	  more	  
valuable	  for	  
Washington	  to	  
maintain	  a	  positive	  
rapport	  than	  to	  allow	  
the	  [A.Q.	  Khan]	  
scandal	  to	  spoil	  the	  
relationship.”	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deliver	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  battlefield	  targets.	  	  More	  systems	  are	  believed	  to	  be	  in	  the	  development	  pipeline,	  including	  a	  nuclear-­‐capable	  submarine-­‐launched	  cruise	  missile.	  	  Fissile	  material	  production	  is	  also	  on	  the	  rise.	  	  Advanced	  P-­‐3	  and	  P-­‐4	  gas	  centrifuges	  are	  online	  at	  Khan	  Research	  Laboratories,	  a	  new	  uranium	  mine	  is	  set	  to	  open	  at	  the	  Karak	  district	  of	  Khyber	  Pakhtunkhwa	  province	  later	  this	  decade,	  and	  a	  fourth	  plutonium	  production	  reactor	  is	  nearing	  completion	  at	  the	  Khushab	  nuclear	  complex.18	  	  Open-­‐source	  estimates	  place	  the	  current	  fissile	  stockpile	  at	  3	  ±	  1.2	  metric	  tons	  of	  highly-­‐enriched	  uranium	  and	  0.15	  ±	  0.05	  metric	  tons	  of	  plutonium,	  with	  approximately	  90-­‐110	  nuclear	  weapons	  in	  storage.	  	  When	  Khushab-­‐IV	  comes	  online,	  annual	  plutonium	  production	  is	  expected	  to	  reach	  25-­‐50	  kg.19	  Pakistanis	  in	  Track	  II	  fora	  cite	  three	  primary	  drivers	  for	  Pakistan’s	  arsenal	  expansion	  and	  why	  credible	  minimum	  deterrence	  is	  such	  a	  moving	  target.	  	  The	  first	  driver	  was	  the	  2001-­‐2	  military	  standoff	  with	  India.	  	  The	  crisis	  was	  ignited	  when	  Pakistan-­‐based	  extremists	  attacked	  the	  Indian	  parliament	  building	  in	  New	  Delhi,	  prompting	  India	  to	  mobilize	  its	  army	  to	  the	  international	  border.	  	  Although	  war	  was	  averted,	  Pakistani	  security	  managers	  were	  reminded	  of	  the	  existential	  threat	  posed	  by	  their	  eastern	  neighbor.	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  standoff,	  Pakistani	  force	  goals	  were	  relatively	  modest	  because	  it	  was	  believed	  that	  Pakistan’s	  arsenal	  was	  sufficient	  to	  deter	  Indian	  attack.	  	  India’s	  mobilization,	  however,	  made	  Pakistan	  question	  the	  adequacy	  of	  its	  nuclear	  numbers.	  	  Force	  goals	  were	  consequently	  revised	  upward,	  and	  R&D	  was	  fast-­‐tracked	  to	  field	  new	  systems	  more	  rapidly.	  	  In	  essence,	  the	  2001-­‐2	  crises	  compelled	  Pakistan	  to	  redouble	  its	  efforts	  in	  nuclear	  deterrence.	  The	  second	  driver	  came	  in	  2004,	  when	  India	  divulged	  its	  new	  military	  doctrine,	  “Cold	  Start.”	  	  Cold	  Start	  envisions	  fighting	  and	  winning	  a	  limited	  conventional	  war	  with	  Pakistan	  without	  provoking	  nuclear	  retaliation.	  	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  Pakistan	  interpreted	  Cold	  Start	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  its	  deterrent	  credibility	  and	  subsequently	  began	  to	  miniaturize	  warheads	  for	  low-­‐yield,	  tactical	  use.	  	  In	  April	  2011,	  Pakistan	  conducted	  a	  successful	  flight	  test	  of	  a	  60	  km-­‐range	  ballistic	  missile	  dubbed	  “Nasr.”	  	  According	  to	  the	  Inter-­‐Services	  Public	  Relations	  press	  release	  on	  the	  flight	  test,	  Nasr	  “carries	  nuclear	  warheads	  of	  appropriate	  yield	  with	  high	  accuracy,	  shoot	  and	  scoot	  attributes.	  	  This	  quick	  response	  system	  addresses	  the	  need	  to	  deter	  evolving	  threats.”20	  	  This	  statement,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  subsequent	  flight	  tests	  in	  2012	  and	  2013,	  suggest	  that	  Pakistan	  has	  accomplished	  the	  difficult	  engineering	  feat	  of	  warhead	  miniaturization.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  International	  Panel	  on	  Fissile	  Materials,	  Global	  Fissile	  Material	  Report	  2010:	  Balancing	  the	  Books:	  Production	  
and	  Stocks	  (2010),	  127,	  http://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr10.pdf.	  19	  International	  Panel	  on	  Fissile	  Materials,	  "Pakistan,"	  http://fissilematerials.org/countries/pakistan.html	  (updated	  February	  3,	  2013).	  20	  Pakistan	  Inter-­‐Services	  Public	  Relations,	  news	  release	  no.	  PR94/2011-­‐ISPR,	  April	  19,	  2011,	  https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-­‐press_release&id=1721.	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The	  third	  driver	  frequently	  cited	  by	  Pakistanis	  is	  the	  2005	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  civilian	  nuclear	  cooperation	  deal,	  approved	  by	  Congress	  in	  2008.	  	  This	  deal	  allows	  India,	  under	  IAEA	  supervision,	  to	  import	  uranium	  to	  fuel	  its	  civilian	  nuclear	  reactors.	  	  Notionally,	  India	  is	  therefore	  free	  to	  divert	  the	  entirety	  of	  its	  domestic	  uranium	  stocks	  toward	  military	  use	  and	  leverage	  international	  suppliers	  to	  fuel	  its	  civilian	  installations.	  	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  India	  has	  adopted	  this	  offset	  strategy,	  the	  history	  of	  conflict	  on	  the	  subcontinent	  compels	  Pakistani	  security	  managers	  to	  prepare	  for	  the	  worst	  by	  fielding	  a	  suite	  of	  delivery	  means	  and	  augmenting	  fissile	  material	  production.	  Taken	  together,	  the	  three	  drivers	  listed	  above	  indicate	  that	  Pakistan’s	  arsenal	  expansion	  is	  a	  symptom	  of	  the	  mutual	  mistrust	  and	  security	  dilemma	  in	  South	  Asia.	  	  Given	  the	  history	  of	  crisis	  and	  war	  on	  the	  subcontinent,	  Pakistan	  views	  India	  through	  a	  dark	  lens	  and	  perpetually	  hedges	  against	  India’s	  military	  dominance.	  	  If	  détente	  were	  to	  prevail	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan,	  the	  nuclear	  competition	  could	  be	  reasonably	  expected	  to	  decrease	  with	  time.	  	  Unfortunately,	  the	  geopolitical	  trend	  lines	  in	  South	  Asia	  do	  not	  bode	  well	  for	  a	  long-­‐term	  bilateral	  rapprochement.	  	  Pakistan	  is	  looking	  to	  deepen	  its	  nuclear	  cooperation	  with	  India’s	  rival,	  China,	  to	  counter	  the	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  nuclear	  accord	  and	  the	  concomitant	  fissile	  advantage	  New	  Delhi	  enjoys.	  	  Sino-­‐Pakistani	  nuclear	  cooperation	  is	  not	  necessarily	  new,	  as	  it	  has	  existed	  since	  the	  1970s	  before	  the	  Nuclear	  Suppliers	  Group	  came	  into	  being,	  but	  it	  has	  increased	  in	  recent	  years.21	  	  Today,	  China	  is	  helping	  construct	  a	  nuclear	  energy	  complex	  in	  Karachi,	  and	  a	  deal	  for	  China	  to	  provide	  three	  additional	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  is	  in	  the	  works.22	  	  As	  Sino-­‐Pakistani	  cooperation	  magnifies,	  India	  will	  suspect	  collusion	  and	  encirclement.	  	  Mistrust	  will	  increase,	  intensifying	  the	  security	  dilemma	  and	  spoiling	  the	  prospects	  of	  détente.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  vertical	  proliferation	  is	  likely	  to	  proceed	  apace,	  not	  only	  in	  Pakistan,	  but	  also	  in	  India,	  and	  international	  arms	  control	  efforts	  such	  as	  the	  Fissile	  Material	  Cutoff	  Treaty	  will	  remain	  in	  limbo.	  	  
Nonproliferation	  Diplomacy	  
	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  experimented	  with	  three	  different	  diplomatic	  approaches	  to	  curtail	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  program,	  but	  only	  one	  of	  these	  approaches	  remains	  viable	  today.	  	  The	  first	  approach	  was	  one	  of	  bilateral	  inducement	  and	  took	  place	  in	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  Critics	  argue	  that	  Sino-­‐Pakistani	  nuclear	  cooperation	  is	  forbidden	  by	  the	  NSG,	  but	  Beijing	  counters	  that	  its	  nuclear	  dealings	  with	  Islamabad	  existed	  before	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  NSG	  and	  are	  therefore	  grandfathered.	  22	  Saeed	  Shah,	  "Pakistan	  in	  Talks	  to	  Acquire	  3	  Nuclear	  Plants	  from	  China,"	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  January	  20,	  2014,	  http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304757004579332460821261146.	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the	  Cold	  War	  context	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  ‘80s.	  	  The	  United	  States	  offered	  to	  provide	  military	  technology	  to	  Pakistan	  to	  offset	  its	  conventional	  imbalance	  with	  India.	  	  The	  idea	  was	  that	  if	  Pakistan	  felt	  confident	  in	  balancing	  India	  conventionally,	  it	  would	  forego	  its	  nuclear	  ambitions.	  	  This	  policy	  failed	  because	  Pakistan	  insisted	  that	  its	  nuclear	  program	  was	  peaceful	  and	  was	  not	  convinced	  that	  conventional	  weaponry	  could	  replace	  nuclear	  deterrence.	  	  Further,	  Pakistan	  was	  not	  assured	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  a	  reliable	  long-­‐term	  provider	  of	  conventional	  weapons,	  given	  the	  arms	  embargo	  imposed	  after	  the	  1965	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  War	  and	  the	  sanctions	  that	  were	  applied	  in	  the	  late	  1970s.	  	  Today,	  substantive	  military	  sales	  are	  a	  non-­‐starter	  given	  the	  blowback	  it	  would	  generate	  for	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  relations	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  bipartisan	  support	  for	  Pakistan	  in	  Congress.	  	  Pakistan	  thus	  continues	  to	  rely	  on	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  offset	  the	  growing	  conventional	  asymmetry	  with	  India.	  The	  second	  U.S.	  approach	  was	  to	  focus	  on	  multilateral	  diplomacy.	  	  India’s	  1974	  nuclear	  test	  prompted	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Nuclear	  Suppliers	  Group	  (NSG)	  –	  an	  international	  export	  control	  regime	  designed	  to	  restrict	  the	  transfer	  of	  sensitive	  nuclear	  components	  and	  dual-­‐use	  technology	  to	  non-­‐NPT	  states.	  	  Other	  export	  control	  apparatuses	  were	  subsequently	  formed	  to	  bolster	  the	  global	  nonproliferation	  establishment,	  such	  as	  the	  Missile	  Technology	  Control	  Regime	  (1987)	  and	  the	  Australia	  Group	  (1985).23	  	  International	  treaties	  such	  as	  the	  Comprehensive	  Test	  Ban	  Treaty	  (1996)	  and	  the	  Fissile	  Material	  Cutoff	  Treaty	  (proposed	  in	  1993	  and	  yet	  to	  be	  negotiated)	  were	  designed	  –	  in	  part	  –	  to	  stall	  the	  nuclear	  programs	  of	  non-­‐NPT	  states.	  	  Pakistan	  resisted	  these	  export	  control	  regimes	  and	  international	  treaties,	  interpreting	  them	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  blunt	  its	  nuclear	  aspirations.	  The	  U.S.	  third	  approach	  involved	  unilateral	  sanctions	  and	  nonproliferation	  laws	  intended	  to	  derail	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  program.	  	  Examples	  include	  the	  Symington	  Amendment	  (1976),	  Glenn	  Amendment	  (1977),	  Solarz	  Amendment	  (1984),	  and	  the	  Pressler	  Amendment	  (1985).	  	  In	  general,	  these	  laws	  forbade	  foreign	  aid	  to	  non-­‐NPT	  states	  that	  were	  actively	  pursuing	  nuclear	  capability	  or	  illicitly	  exporting	  nuclear	  technologies	  abroad.	  	  At	  best,	  these	  instruments	  slowed	  down	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  weapons	  program	  but	  ultimately	  failed	  to	  dent	  its	  ambitions	  –	  especially	  since	  the	  United	  States	  abandoned	  the	  sanction	  strategy	  during	  the	  Soviet	  war	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  instead	  showered	  Islamabad	  with	  economic	  and	  military	  aid.24	  	  After	  the	  Cold	  War	  ended,	  the	  United	  States	  re-­‐imposed	  sanctions	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  coerce	  Pakistan	  to	  “cap	  and	  roll	  back”	  its	  nuclear	  program,	  but	  this	  failed	  to	  deter	  Pakistan’s	  1998	  nuclear	  test.	  	  Sanctions	  were	  lifted	  again	  in	  2001,	  owing	  to	  Washington’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Note	  that	  the	  Australia	  Group’s	  export	  control	  lists	  are	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  the	  spread	  of	  chemical	  and	  biological	  weapons	  and	  technologies.	  	  The	  Australia	  Group	  therefore	  supplements	  the	  Chemical	  Weapons	  Convention	  (1997)	  and	  Biological	  Weapons	  Convention	  (1975).	  24	  Of	  note,	  Pakistan	  was	  ready	  for	  a	  nuclear	  explosive	  test	  in	  1984-­‐85	  but	  decided	  against	  it,	  primarily	  because	  it	  would	  have	  jeopardized	  the	  continued	  provision	  of	  aid.	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need	  to	  maintain	  Pakistani	  counterterrorism	  and	  counterinsurgency	  cooperation	  in	  the	  Afghanistan-­‐Pakistan	  borderlands.	  In	  Pakistan	  today,	  the	  only	  surviving	  aspect	  of	  the	  three-­‐pronged	  U.S.	  nonproliferation	  strategy	  is	  multilateral	  diplomacy	  –	  specifically	  export	  control	  agreements	  and	  nonproliferation	  treaties.	  	  Although	  Pakistan	  is	  not	  a	  formal	  member	  of	  the	  global	  export	  control	  regime,	  Pakistan	  has	  passed	  its	  own	  domestic	  export	  control	  laws	  that	  mirror	  the	  international	  best	  practices	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  NSG,	  Missile	  Technology	  Control	  Regime,	  and	  Australia	  Group.	  	  Pakistan’s	  efforts	  are	  part	  of	  a	  messaging	  strategy	  to	  erase	  the	  stigma	  of	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  affair	  and	  show	  the	  world	  that	  it	  is	  a	  responsible	  nuclear	  power	  that	  deserves	  unimpeded	  nuclear	  commerce.	  	  Pakistan’s	  hope	  is	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  international	  community	  will	  reward	  its	  responsible	  behavior	  by	  easing	  export	  control	  restrictions	  and	  perhaps	  supporting	  Pakistani	  membership	  in	  the	  NSG.	  	  In	  reality,	  however,	  Pakistan’s	  NSG	  membership	  bid	  lacks	  international	  backing.	  	  India’s	  candidacy,	  meanwhile,	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  France,	  Britain,	  and	  Russia.	  Washington’s	  support	  for	  Indian	  membership	  in	  the	  NSG	  is	  a	  major	  point	  of	  contention	  in	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  relations.	  	  Pakistanis	  in	  Track	  II	  fora	  often	  accuse	  the	  West	  of	  nuclear	  discrimination	  and	  unjust	  isolation.	  	  They	  hold	  that	  the	  NSG	  admission	  process	  has	  become	  politicized	  and	  find	  it	  ironic	  that	  India,	  the	  country	  whose	  1974	  nuclear	  test	  prompted	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  NSG,	  is	  being	  considered	  for	  membership	  while	  Pakistan	  remains	  excluded.	  	  There	  is	  a	  serious	  risk	  that	  Pakistan,	  at	  some	  future	  date,	  may	  become	  disillusioned	  with	  its	  quest	  for	  nuclear	  normalcy	  and	  abandon	  its	  cooperation	  with	  the	  international	  nonproliferation	  regime	  altogether.	  	  If	  India	  is	  to	  be	  granted	  a	  place	  in	  the	  NSG,	  Pakistan	  should	  be	  offered	  a	  roadmap	  or	  set	  of	  criteria	  for	  eventual	  accession.	  	  This	  would	  do	  much	  to	  maintain	  Pakistan’s	  “buy-­‐in”	  for	  the	  global	  export	  control	  regime.	  While	  the	  debate	  over	  export	  controls	  continues,	  Pakistan’s	  participation	  in	  multilateral	  nonproliferation	  treaties	  is	  in	  stasis.	  	  Pakistan	  actively	  participated	  in	  the	  negotiation	  of	  the	  Comprehensive	  Test	  Ban	  Treaty	  but	  has	  refused	  to	  sign	  it	  until	  India	  agrees	  to	  do	  so.	  	  As	  for	  the	  Fissile	  Material	  Cutoff	  Treaty	  (FMCT),	  Pakistan	  has	  reservations	  about	  its	  scope	  and	  purpose	  and	  has	  blocked	  its	  negotiation.	  	  Pakistan	  contends	  that	  the	  “cutoff”	  implies	  that	  the	  treaty,	  when	  enforced,	  would	  place	  a	  ceiling	  on	  fissile	  material	  production	  without	  accounting	  for	  fissile	  material	  stockpiles.	  	  Since	  India’s	  fissile	  material	  stockpile	  is	  greater	  than	  Pakistan’s,	  the	  treaty	  would	  freeze	  Pakistan	  at	  a	  disadvantage.	  	  Pakistan	  continues	  to	  delay	  the	  FMCT	  in	  order	  to	  grow	  its	  fissile	  material	  stocks	  and	  to	  signal	  its	  displeasure	  with	  the	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  nuclear	  deal.	  	  	  
“If	  India	  is	  to	  be	  
granted	  a	  place	  in	  the	  
NSG,	  Pakistan	  should	  
be	  offered	  a	  roadmap	  
or	  set	  of	  criteria	  for	  
eventual	  accession.	  	  
This	  would	  do	  much	  to	  
maintain	  Pakistan’s	  
‘buy-­‐in’	  for	  the	  global	  
export	  control	  
regime.”	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Nuclear	  Stability	  The	  question	  of	  nuclear	  stability	  in	  South	  Asia	  –	  also	  known	  as	  deterrence	  stability	  –	  accrued	  newfound	  urgency	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  India’s	  and	  Pakistan’s	  1998	  nuclear	  tests.	  	  With	  the	  nuclearization	  of	  the	  subcontinent	  a	  fait	  accompli,	  some	  U.S.	  policymakers,	  strategists,	  and	  academics	  began	  to	  divest	  attention	  away	  from	  nonproliferation,	  fixating	  instead	  on	  how	  to	  avert	  the	  outbreak	  of	  war	  between	  the	  two	  nuclear-­‐armed	  rivals.	  	  Deterrence	  stability	  proved	  tenuous,	  however,	  as	  highlighted	  by	  the	  1999	  Kargil	  War	  in	  the	  rugged	  heights	  of	  Kashmir,	  where	  Pakistani	  militants	  and	  regular	  forces	  crossed	  the	  Line	  of	  Control	  and	  occupied	  Indian	  border	  posts	  that	  had	  been	  abandoned	  in	  the	  harsh	  winter.	  	  	  Another	  crisis	  occurred	  in	  2001-­‐2,	  after	  Pakistan-­‐based	  militants	  from	  Lashkar-­‐e-­‐Taiba	  and	  Jaish-­‐e-­‐Mohammed	  attacked	  the	  Indian	  Parliament	  building	  in	  New	  Delhi,	  killing	  seven	  and	  injuring	  18.	  	  The	  2001-­‐2	  standoff	  culminated	  in	  India’s	  Operation	  Parakram,	  wherein	  India	  mobilized	  its	  strike	  corps	  to	  the	  international	  border	  after	  weeks	  of	  delay.	  	  During	  these	  crises,	  international	  intervention	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  restoring	  peace.	  	  Yet	  India,	  increasingly	  fed	  up	  with	  Pakistan’s	  use	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  as	  an	  irregular	  military	  force	  and	  embarrassed	  by	  its	  slow	  mobilization	  during	  Operation	  Parakram,	  embarked	  upon	  a	  military	  doctrinal	  review.	  	  This	  review	  culminated	  in	  the	  2004	  announcement	  of	  a	  rapid-­‐mobilization,	  limited	  war	  doctrine	  that	  observers	  have	  dubbed	  “Cold	  Start.”	  	  Cold	  Start,	  if	  actualized,	  would	  involve	  sending	  several	  division-­‐sized	  integrated	  battle	  groups	  (IBGs)	  in	  a	  shallow	  incursion	  across	  the	  international	  border	  within	  days	  of	  a	  crisis.	  	  The	  objective	  of	  Cold	  Start	  would	  not	  be	  to	  seize	  large	  portions	  of	  territory,	  but	  to	  punish	  Pakistan	  for	  some	  transgression	  (e.g.,	  cross-­‐border	  militant	  attacks)	  and	  avoid	  triggering	  Pakistani	  nuclear	  redlines	  in	  the	  process.	  	  Since	  the	  disclosure	  of	  Cold	  Start,	  the	  nuclear	  stability	  forecast	  in	  South	  Asia	  has	  been	  increasingly	  gloomy.	  	  Pakistan	  doubts	  that	  Cold	  Start’s	  aims	  are	  truly	  “limited”	  and	  has	  therefore	  sought	  to	  augment	  its	  security,	  most	  recently	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  short-­‐range	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons	  (TNW)	  such	  as	  the	  60	  km	  Nasr.	  	  Thus,	  Cold	  Start	  has	  inadvertently	  brought	  about	  the	  latest	  round	  in	  a	  high-­‐stakes	  action-­‐reaction	  cycle.	  	  Cold	  Start	  has	  compressed	  the	  operational	  timeframe	  for	  military	  action,	  and	  TNW	  have	  lowered	  the	  threshold	  for	  nuclear	  use.	  	  For	  these	  reasons,	  a	  crisis-­‐triggering	  event	  may	  rapidly	  proceed	  to	  full-­‐scale	  war,	  and	  nuclear	  escalation	  may	  occur	  swiftly	  thereafter.	  	  Nuclear	  stability	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  talked-­‐about	  subject	  in	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  Track	  II	  discourse.	  	  Drawing	  from	  over	  a	  decade	  of	  Track	  II	  meetings,	  this	  report	  identifies	  nine	  major	  variables	  that	  are	  disrupting	  the	  nuclear	  stability	  equation	  in	  South	  Asia:	  	  (1)	  the	  enduring	  rivalry	  and	  security	  dilemma	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan;	  (2)	  military	  doctrinal	  dissonance;	  (3)	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons;	  (4)	  sea-­‐based	  deterrents;	  (5)	  nuclear	  command	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and	  control	  challenges;	  (6)	  ballistic	  missile	  defense;	  (7)	  conflict	  escalation	  dynamics;	  (8)	  tepid	  progress	  in	  confidence-­‐building	  and	  arms	  control;	  and	  (9)	  emerging	  flashpoints	  for	  conflict.	  	  Each	  variable	  is	  examined	  in	  detail	  below.	  	  
Enduring	  Rivalry	  &	  Security	  Dilemma	  
	  The	  enduring	  rivalry	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  is	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  the	  security	  dilemma	  and	  destabilizing	  arms	  race	  in	  South	  Asia.	  	  Fearing	  India’s	  military	  capabilities	  and	  intentions,	  Pakistan	  has	  fielded	  eight	  new	  nuclear	  delivery	  systems	  since	  1998,	  and	  India	  has	  responded	  with	  nine	  of	  its	  own,	  though	  New	  Delhi’s	  security	  calculations	  also	  account	  for	  China.25	  	  The	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  rivalry	  has	  been	  heavily	  debated	  in	  academia	  and	  Track	  II	  and	  is	  a	  key	  driver	  of	  nuclear	  instability	  on	  the	  subcontinent,	  both	  historically	  and	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  	  	  The	  sources	  of	  the	  enduring	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  rivalry	  are	  threefold.	  	  First	  is	  the	  unresolved	  ideological	  disagreement	  of	  the	  1947	  partition.	  	  India	  has	  always	  opposed	  the	  “two	  nation	  theory”	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  subcontinent	  should	  be	  unified	  by	  its	  common	  ethnicity	  and	  heritage,	  rather	  than	  divided	  along	  the	  religious	  fault-­‐lines	  of	  Hindu	  versus	  Muslim.	  This	  line	  of	  thinking	  portrays	  Pakistan	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  India	  at	  best,	  and	  a	  breakaway	  province	  at	  worst.	  	  Second	  is	  the	  disputed	  territory	  of	  Kashmir,	  which	  has	  been	  the	  flashpoint	  for	  three	  of	  the	  four	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  wars	  and	  is	  an	  emblem	  of	  the	  ideological	  dispute	  over	  the	  partition.	  	  Pakistan	  claims	  Kashmir	  based	  on	  its	  Muslim	  majority	  population	  and	  geographic	  contiguity,	  whereas	  India’s	  claim	  is	  based	  on	  the	  1947	  Instrument	  of	  Accession	  and	  India’s	  claim	  to	  maintain	  its	  secular	  state	  credentials.	  	  The	  third	  irritant	  is	  Pakistan’s	  employment	  of	  subconventional	  forces	  (i.e.,	  militant	  groups)	  to	  fuel	  an	  insurgency	  in	  India-­‐administered	  Kashmir,	  beginning	  in	  1989.	  	  Since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Kashmir	  insurgency	  and	  the	  concomitant	  Soviet	  retreat	  from	  Afghanistan,	  Pakistan	  has	  found	  it	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  exert	  full	  control	  over	  the	  militant	  groups	  based	  within	  its	  borders,	  such	  as	  Lashkar-­‐e-­‐Taiba	  (LeT)	  and	  Jaish-­‐e-­‐Mohammed	  (JeM).	  	  Today,	  these	  groups	  are	  wildcard	  spoilers	  in	  the	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  relationship;	  they	  can	  bring	  the	  two	  countries	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  crisis	  and	  war	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  choosing,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  2001	  attack	  on	  the	  Indian	  parliament	  building	  and	  the	  2008	  Mumbai	  attack.	  	  India	  believes	  that	  the	  Pakistani	  government	  is	  complicit	  in	  these	  attacks,	  though	  Islamabad	  insists	  that	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perpetrators	  are	  terrorists	  who	  acted	  independently	  and	  illegally.	  	  Islamabad	  also	  accuses	  New	  Delhi	  of	  funding	  its	  own	  insurgency	  in	  the	  Pakistani	  province	  of	  Baluchistan.	  	  The	  enduring	  rivalry’s	  impact	  on	  the	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  security	  dilemma	  has	  been	  debated	  exhaustively	  on	  the	  Track	  II	  circuit,	  with	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  the	  controversial	  use	  of	  subconventional	  forces.	  	  One	  subject	  that	  is	  potentially	  worth	  closer	  examination,	  however,	  is	  how	  the	  U.S.	  rebalance	  to	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  could	  aggravate	  the	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  security	  dilemma	  in	  the	  coming	  years	  and	  decades.	  	  Increased	  U.S.	  military	  presence	  in	  the	  Pacific	  obliges	  China	  to	  augment	  its	  conventional	  and	  nuclear	  forces,	  which	  naturally	  compels	  New	  Delhi	  to	  follow	  suit.	  	  Although	  India’s	  military	  investments	  are	  aimed	  at	  deterring	  Chinese	  adventurism,	  the	  history	  of	  enduring	  rivalry	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  means	  that	  any	  qualitative	  or	  quantitative	  improvement	  in	  India’s	  arsenal	  poses	  a	  danger	  for	  which	  Pakistan	  must	  account.	  	  Pakistan,	  however,	  is	  unable	  to	  compete	  with	  India	  in	  the	  conventional	  realm	  due	  to	  fiscal	  constraints	  and	  therefore	  doubles	  down	  on	  its	  nuclear	  program	  to	  maintain	  a	  competitive,	  albeit	  asymmetric,	  edge.	  	  The	  strategic	  ripple	  effect	  does	  not	  end	  there.	  	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  military	  advancements	  cast	  a	  shadow	  on	  Iran;	  Iranian	  investments	  threaten	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Israel;	  and	  so	  on.	  	  By	  fostering	  discussion	  of	  this	  complex	  strategic	  cascade	  in	  the	  Track	  II	  circuit,	  the	  United	  States	  will	  be	  better	  equipped	  to	  anticipate	  and	  understand	  the	  delayed	  effects	  that	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  rebalance	  will	  have	  on	  security	  competition	  in	  South	  Asia	  and	  beyond.	  	  
Military	  Doctrinal	  Dissonance	  
	  The	  dissimilar	  nuclear	  use	  doctrines	  of	  India	  and	  Pakistan,	  coupled	  with	  conventional	  doctrinal	  evolutions	  that	  emphasize	  rapid	  military	  mobilization	  and	  deployment	  have	  both	  raised	  the	  stakes	  and	  reduced	  the	  lead	  times	  of	  conflict	  in	  South	  Asia.	  	  The	  end	  result	  is	  a	  regional	  environment	  in	  which	  a	  conflict	  that	  begins	  as	  limited	  and	  conventional	  could	  rapidly	  spiral	  to	  a	  full-­‐blown	  nuclear	  exchange.	  	  India’s	  declaratory	  nuclear	  doctrine,	  revealed	  in	  2003,	  is	  no	  first	  use	  (NFU)	  but	  vows	  massive	  retaliation	  against	  any	  state	  that	  employs	  WMD	  of	  any	  yield	  against	  Indian	  forces	  at	  any	  time	  or	  place.	  	  A	  defensive	  Pakistani	  nuclear	  strike	  against	  an	  invading	  Indian	  armored	  column,	  for	  instance,	  would	  notionally	  trigger	  massive	  retaliation,	  even	  if	  the	  strike	  occurred	  on	  Pakistani	  soil.	  	  Critics	  in	  Track	  II	  fora	  have	  decried	  this	  policy	  as	  brute-­‐force,	  disproportionate,	  knee-­‐jerk,	  and	  therefore	  non-­‐credible.	  	  Indian	  proponents	  of	  massive	  retaliation	  contend	  that	  the	  policy	  enhances	  India’s	  deterrence	  credibility	  because	  it	  is	  unambiguous	  and	  publicly	  declared.	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Public	  declaration	  obliges	  New	  Delhi	  to	  follow	  through	  with	  the	  policy	  if	  it	  is	  tested,	  lest	  India’s	  credibility	  be	  reduced	  to	  shreds.	  	  	  Where	  India	  has	  embraced	  nuclear	  doctrinal	  transparency	  and	  NFU,	  the	  Pakistanis	  have	  embraced	  ambiguity.	  	  In	  keeping	  with	  this	  ambiguous	  posture,	  Pakistan	  reserves	  the	  right	  for	  nuclear	  first	  use	  but	  refuses	  to	  explicitly	  declare	  its	  nuclear	  redlines,	  instead	  opting	  to	  leave	  them	  shrouded	  in	  a	  fog	  of	  uncertainty.	  	  So	  the	  Pakistani	  thinking	  goes,	  this	  uncertainty	  paralyzes	  Indian	  decision-­‐makers	  by	  forcing	  them	  to	  second-­‐guess	  as	  to	  when,	  where,	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances	  Pakistan	  would	  use	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  An	  opaque	  nuclear	  doctrine	  also	  affords	  deployment	  and	  employment	  flexibility,	  helping	  Pakistan	  avoid	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  commitment	  trap	  that	  India	  would	  face	  if	  its	  massive	  retaliation	  doctrine	  were	  tested.	  	  Despite	  Pakistan’s	  ambiguous	  redlines,	  some	  general	  and	  vague	  thresholds	  have	  been	  declared.	  	  In	  a	  2002	  interview,	  Lt.	  General	  Khalid	  Kidwai,	  Director-­‐General	  of	  the	  Strategic	  Plans	  Division,	  stated	  that	  if	  Pakistan	  suffers	  an	  unacceptable	  degree	  of	  spatial	  ingress,	  physical	  destruction,	  economic	  strangulation,	  and/or	  domestic	  destabilization	  from	  an	  outside	  power,	  it	  will	  be	  grounds	  for	  nuclear	  retaliation.	  	  	  Taken	  at	  face	  value,	  India	  and	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  doctrines	  create	  a	  dangerous	  causality	  chain.	  	  A	  limited,	  defensive	  first	  use	  by	  Pakistan	  would	  incur	  Indian	  massive	  retaliation,	  which	  would	  elicit	  a	  punitive	  second	  strike	  from	  Pakistan’s	  surviving	  nuclear	  assets.	  	  Making	  matters	  worse,	  India	  and	  Pakistan’s	  conventional	  force	  doctrines	  emphasize	  rapid	  mobilization	  and	  high-­‐intensity	  warfare.	  	  In	  the	  event	  of	  cross-­‐border	  hostilities,	  these	  doctrines	  could	  act	  as	  a	  swift	  onramp	  to	  nuclear	  escalation.	  	  India’s	  conventional	  war	  doctrine,	  known	  as	  Cold	  Start	  or	  “proactive”	  operations,	  would	  entail	  shallow	  ground	  incursions	  across	  several	  sectors	  of	  the	  international	  border	  within	  48-­‐72	  hours,	  using	  up	  to	  eight	  division-­‐sized	  integrated	  battle	  groups	  (IBGs)	  with	  close	  air	  support.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  Cold	  Start	  would	  be	  to	  punish	  Pakistan	  for	  its	  history	  of	  subconventional	  provocation	  toward	  India	  but	  to	  keep	  the	  conflict	  limited	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  redlines	  are	  not	  violated.	  	  Not	  to	  be	  outdone,	  Pakistan	  revealed	  a	  new	  army	  doctrine	  in	  2011,	  titled	  “Comprehensive	  Response.”	  	  Although	  Comprehensive	  Response	  is	  defensive	  in	  nature,	  it	  ups	  the	  ante	  in	  terms	  of	  mobilization	  time,	  calling	  for	  Pakistani	  defensive	  garrisons	  to	  reach	  their	  battle	  areas	  in	  just	  24-­‐48	  hours.26	  	  Decreased	  mobilization	  time	  also	  grants	  Pakistan	  the	  agility	  to	  mount	  a	  counteroffensive	  across	  the	  international	  border	  at	  the	  place	  of	  its	  choosing	  as	  a	  riposte	  to	  Indian	  attack.	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Cold	  Start	  and	  Comprehensive	  Response	  mean	  South	  Asia	  is	  poised	  for	  a	  rapid-­‐onset,	  high-­‐intensity	  conflict.	  	  Although	  Cold	  Start	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  limited	  war,	  a	  recurring	  theme	  in	  workshops	  and	  table-­‐top	  exercises	  with	  Indians	  and	  Pakistanis	  is	  that	  both	  sides	  are	  forced	  to	  “prepare	  for	  the	  worst”	  during	  conflict	  with	  one	  another.	  	  India,	  upon	  actualizing	  Cold	  Start,	  would	  not	  only	  mobilize	  and	  attack	  with	  its	  IBGs	  but	  would	  also	  begin	  moving	  its	  three	  strike	  corps	  toward	  the	  international	  border	  –	  just	  to	  have	  them	  in	  position	  in	  case	  the	  war	  escalates.	  	  Pakistani	  ISR	  would	  pick	  up	  the	  movement	  of	  India’s	  strike	  corps,	  and	  fearing	  a	  full-­‐scale	  Indian	  assault,	  the	  army	  would	  begin	  withdrawing	  its	  forces	  from	  the	  western	  tribal	  areas	  and	  redeploying	  them	  eastward.	  	  India,	  in	  turn,	  would	  interpret	  Pakistan’s	  redeployment	  as	  a	  major	  escalation	  signal	  and	  intensify	  deep	  air	  interdiction	  operations	  to	  prevent	  these	  forces	  from	  reaching	  the	  front	  lines.	  	  By	  this	  point,	  both	  sides	  would	  likely	  begin	  dispersing	  their	  strategic	  nuclear	  arsenals	  (or	  at	  least	  maintaining	  high	  alert	  status),	  and	  Pakistani	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons	  would	  most	  certainly	  have	  appeared	  in	  the	  battle	  areas	  –	  a	  perturbing	  development	  given	  Islamabad’s	  refusal	  to	  commit	  to	  NFU	  and	  New	  Delhi’s	  promise	  to	  retaliate	  massively.	  	  Although	  it	  is	  unknown	  what	  precise	  conditions	  would	  compel	  Islamabad	  to	  order	  the	  use	  of	  tactical	  weapons,	  Track	  II	  dialogues	  with	  Pakistanis	  have	  provided	  insight	  into	  the	  drivers	  and	  implications	  of	  the	  country’s	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapons	  program.	  	  
Tactical	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  	  In	  April	  2011,	  Pakistan’s	  Inter-­‐Services	  Public	  Relations	  Directorate	  announced	  the	  first	  flight	  test	  of	  the	  Hatf-­‐9/Nasr,	  a	  sold-­‐fuelled	  60	  km-­‐range	  ballistic	  missile	  designed	  to	  deliver	  “nuclear	  warheads	  of	  appropriate	  yield	  with	  high	  accuracy.”27	  	  The	  Nasr	  is	  fired	  from	  a	  road-­‐mobile	  multiple	  launch	  rocket	  system	  (MLRS),	  providing	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  battlefield	  maneuverability.	  	  With	  these	  attributes,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Nasr	  is	  a	  low-­‐yield	  tactical	  nuclear	  weapon	  (TNW),	  but	  why	  has	  Pakistan	  developed	  TNW,	  and	  what	  implications	  do	  TNW	  portend	  for	  nuclear	  stability?	  Pakistan’s	  logic	  for	  developing	  TNW	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  fear	  that	  a	  nuclear	  deterrent	  composed	  solely	  of	  high-­‐yield,	  city-­‐busting	  warheads	   lacks	  credibility	  against	  a	   limited	  conventional	  attack	  in	  the	  flavor	  of	  Cold	  Start.	  	  Pakistan	  hopes	  that	  TNW	  will	  lower	  the	  nuclear	  threshold	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Pakistan	  Inter-­‐Services	  Public	  Relations,	  news	  release	  no.	  PR94/2011-­‐ISPR.	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and	  thereby	  deny	  India	  the	  space	  to	  wage	  a	  conventional	  war	  under	  the	  nuclear	  overhang.	  	  TNW	  are	   therefore	  an	   indispensable	  element	  of	  what	  many	  Pakistani	  officials	   refer	   to	  as	  “full-­‐spectrum	  deterrence.”	  If	  India	  does	  initiate	  Cold	  Start,	  however,	  full-­‐spectrum	  deterrence	  would	  fail.	  Pakistanis	  in	  Track	  II	  fora	  have	  signaled	  a	  willingness	  to	  employ	  TNW	  on	  their	  own	  soil	  against	  marauding	  Indian	  forces.	  	  Although	  this	  would	  nominally	  trigger	  massive	  retaliation	  from	  India,	  Pakistanis	  strongly	  doubt	  that	  New	  Delhi	  would	  “go	  strategic”	  for	  two	  primary	  reasons.	  	  First,	  massive	  retaliation	  against	  a	  limited	  defensive	  use	  of	  TNW	  in	  Pakistani	  Punjab	  or	  Sindh	  is	  disproportionate	  and	  arguably	  non-­‐credible.	  	  Second,	  Indian	  massive	  retaliation	  would	  prompt	  a	  Pakistani	  second	  strike,	  thus	  the	  specter	  of	  “mutually	  assured	  destruction”	  should	  dissuade	  India	  from	  using	  its	  strategic	  nuclear	  assets	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Pakistanis	  think	  that	  the	  more	  credible	  and	  reasonable	  Indian	  response	  would	  be	  a	  nuclear	  “tit-­‐for-­‐tat.”	  	  Indian	  participants	  in	  Track	  IIs,	  in	  contrast,	  are	  adamant	  that	  a	  TNW	  strike	  would	  trigger	  massive	  retaliation.	  	  They	  furthermore	  insist	  that	  the	  appearance	  of	  TNW	  batteries	  on	  the	  battlefield	  will	  not	  dissuade	  or	  deter	  India’s	  political	  leadership	  or	  military	  brass.	  	  In	  the	  event	  of	  an	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  war,	  a	  worrying	  scenario	  could	  emerge	  where	  Pakistan	  faces	  a	  “use	  it	  or	  lose	  it”	  dilemma	  over	  its	  battlefield-­‐deployed	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  Retired	  Indian	  flag	  officers	  in	  various	  Track	  II	  meetings	  have	  stressed	  that	  battlefield-­‐deployed	  Nasr	  platforms	  will	  be	  promptly	  targeted	  via	  airstrikes	  and	  ground	  attack	  wherever	  they	  are	  found.	  	  Recall	  that	  Nasr	  has	  just	  a	  60	  km	  range,	  so	  even	  if	  the	  launchers	  were	  deployed	  a	  full	  60	  km	  inside	  the	  Pakistani	  border,	  invading	  Indian	  ground	  forces	  would	  be	  relatively	  proximate	  from	  the	  initial	  point	  of	  ingress	  and	  could	  rapidly	  close	  in.	  	  If	  Pakistan	  finds	  itself	  in	  danger	  of	  losing	  its	  battlefield	  deterrent,	  there	  will	  be	  considerable	  pressure	  to	  “push	  the	  button.”	  	  
Sea-­‐Based	  Deterrent	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  sea-­‐based	  nuclear	  delivery	  systems	  in	  South	  Asia	  will	  have	  serious	  implications	  for	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  crisis	  stability	  and	  deterrence	  stability	  in	  the	  current	  decade	  and	  beyond.	  	  India’s	  Arihant	  SSBN	  is	  already	  in	  limited	  operational	  capacity	  and	  will	  be	  armed	  with	  nuclear-­‐capable	  K-­‐15/Sagarika	  ballistic	  missiles	  with	  700	  km	  range.	  	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  keep	  pace,	  Pakistan	  inaugurated	  its	  Naval	  Strategic	  Forces	  Command	  in	  2012	  and	  seeks	  to	  operationalize	  a	  sea-­‐based	  deterrent	  by	  means	  of	  Agosta-­‐class	  submarines	  armed	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with	  nuclear-­‐tipped	  cruise	  missiles.	  	  Pakistani	  surface	  vessels	  could	  also	  be	  armed	  with	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  Some	  Pakistanis	  have	  suggested	  that	  Islamabad	  does	  not	  envision	  a	  first	  strike	  mission	  for	  its	  sea-­‐based	  nuclear	  assets,	  even	  against	  a	  target	  of	  opportunity	  such	  as	  a	  carrier	  strike	  group.	  	  Instead,	  Pakistan’s	  sea-­‐based	  deterrent	  is	  just	  that	  –	  a	  deterrent	  –	  that	  is	  charged	  with	  maintaining	  the	  survivability	  of	  the	  country’s	  retaliatory	  second	  strike.	  	  	  	  Academic	  and	  strategic	  discourse	  on	  deterrence	  stability	  in	  South	  Asia	  has	  traditionally	  been	  land-­‐centric,	  but	  as	  naval	  forces	  expand	  and	  go	  nuclear,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  leverage	  Track	  II	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  they	  will	  have	  on	  the	  stability	  equation.	  	  One	  of	  the	  potential	  consequences	  of	  operational	  sea-­‐based	  deterrents	  is	  dangerous	  uncertainty	  on	  the	  high	  seas.	  	  A	  surface	  ship	  conducting	  anti-­‐submarine	  warfare,	  for	  example,	  has	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  whether	  its	  undersea	  target	  is	  nuclear-­‐armed,	  but	  if	  Arihant	  or	  a	  nuclear-­‐armed	  
Agosta	  are	  sunk,	  it	  could	  cause	  an	  escalatory	  spiral	  regardless	  of	  the	  attacker’s	  intentions.	  	  While	  this	  scenario	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  remote	  contingency,	  two	  factors	  could	  greatly	  increase	  its	  likelihood.	  	  First,	  new	  platforms	  such	  as	  the	  P-­‐8	  Poseidon	  maritime	  patrol	  aircraft	  are	  making	  it	  easier	  to	  seek	  out	  and	  target	  submarines.	  	  India	  has	  placed	  orders	  for	  at	  least	  eight	  of	  these	  platforms.	  	  The	  second	  factor	  involves	  naval	  deployment	  density.	  	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  are	  geographically	  contiguous	  and	  their	  navies	  share	  the	  western	  Indian	  Ocean,	  thus	  naval	  deployment	  density	  is	  nominally	  greater	  than	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  wherein	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Soviet	  Union	  were	  geographically	  distant	  and	  their	  naval	  deployments	  were	  dispersed	  throughout	  the	  vast	  expanses	  of	  the	  Atlantic,	  Pacific,	  and	  beyond.	  	  Deployment	  density	  in	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  region	  will	  only	  increase	  in	  the	  coming	  years	  as	  China	  expands	  its	  naval	  reach,	  India	  reacts,	  and	  Pakistan	  counter-­‐reacts.	  	  	  In	  summary,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  are	  beginning	  an	  era	  of	  strategic	  competition	  at	  sea.	  	  Track	  II	  discussion	  of	  this	  topic	  has	  been	  relatively	  scarce,	  so	  it	  is	  prudent	  to	  begin	  gathering	  and	  consulting	  with	  experts	  to	  think	  through	  the	  implications	  that	  sea-­‐based	  deterrents	  pose	  for	  crisis	  and	  deterrence	  stability	  in	  the	  Indian	  Ocean.	  	  
Command	  and	  Control	  Challenges	  	  The	  advent	  of	  TNW	  and	  sea-­‐based	  delivery	  systems	  has	  stirred	  debate	  over	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  command	  and	  control	  (C2)	  system.	  	  Pakistanis	  insist	  that	  C2	  of	  nuclear	  assets	  is	  irrevocably	  centralized	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  National	  Command	  Authority.	  	  While	  this	  may	  be	  feasible	  for	  land-­‐based	  strategic	  weapons,	  centralized	  C2	  of	  road-­‐mobile,	  short-­‐range	  TNW	  is	  conceptually	  and	  logistically	  difficult.	  	  The	  lead	  time	  required	  for	  obtaining	  launch	  authorization	  could	  impede	  field	  commanders	  from	  capitalizing	  on	  fleeting,	  high-­‐value	  targets,	  such	  as	  a	  massed	  Indian	  armored	  column.	  	  Further	  complicating	  matters,	  the	  launch	  code	  transmission	  could	  be	  jammed	  by	  the	  adversary	  and	  rendered	  indecipherable.	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For	  this	  reason,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  Pakistanis	  may	  quickly	  abandon	  centralized	  C2	  early	  in	  a	  crisis	  and	  grant	  predelegated	  launch	  authority	  to	  forward-­‐deployed	  field	  commanders,	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  risk	  of	  inadvertent	  use.	  	  Pakistanis	  in	  Track	  II	  venues	  have	  heard	  these	  concerns	  many	  times	  but	  counter	  that	  the	  deployment	  of	  TNW	  is	  hypothetical	  and	  their	  primary	  purpose	  is	  to	  deter	  Indian	  aggression	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Yet	  these	  hypothetical	  fears	  will	  become	  timely	  and	  tangible	  if	  India	  does	  decide	  to	  embark	  upon	  a	  punitive	  operation	  into	  Pakistani	  territory.	  	  It	  is	  similarly	  challenging	  to	  articulate	  centralized	  C2	  for	  sea-­‐based	  nuclear	  assets.	  	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  India	  has	  the	  Arihant	  SSBN	  and	  Pakistan	  intends	  to	  use	  Agosta-­‐class	  submarines	  and/or	  surface	  ships	  as	  launch	  platforms	  for	  nuclear-­‐tipped	  cruise	  missiles.	  	  As	  with	  road-­‐mobile	  assets,	  seagoing	  vessels	  obviously	  lack	  a	  cable	  link	  with	  central	  command.	  	  This	  implies	  that	  centralized	  launch	  orders	  must	  be	  conveyed	  via	  radio	  transmission	  and	  can	  therefore	  be	  intercepted	  and/or	  jammed.	  	  Conversely,	  if	  C2	  is	  decentralized,	  then	  inadvertent	  or	  unauthorized	  use	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out.	  	  Pakistanis	  in	  Track	  II	  fora	  have	  been	  adamant	  that	  C2	  will	  be	  centralized	  on	  air	  and	  land,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  known	  whether	  this	  principle	  will	  also	  apply	  when	  sea-­‐based	  nuclear	  forces	  go	  underway.	  	  Further	  Track	  II	  discussion	  is	  warranted	  on	  this	  subject.	  	  
Ballistic	  Missile	  Defense	  	  India	  is	  developing	  an	  indigenous	  ballistic	  missile	  defense	  (BMD)	  system	  as	  a	  means	  to	  offset	  growing	  Chinese	  and	  Pakistani	  missile	  capabilities.	  	  India	  claims	  that	  its	  system	  is	  capable	  of	  intercepting	  incoming	  long-­‐range	  missiles	  at	  low	  and	  high	  altitudes	  with	  high	  accuracy,	  though	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  the	  system	  is	  ready	  for	  deployment.	  	  India	  has	  also	  expressed	  interest	  in	  Israel’s	  Iron	  Dome	  system,	  which	  would	  provide	  defense	  against	  short-­‐range	  missiles.	  	  On	  the	  Track	  II	  circuit,	  India’s	  attempts	  to	  achieve	  comprehensive	  missile	  defense	  have	  drawn	  Pakistani	  ire	  and	  skepticism.	  	  Pakistanis	  have	  strong	  doubts	  that	  Indian	  engineers	  can	  overcome	  the	  myriad	  technical	  hurdles	  associated	  with	  missile	  defense,	  citing	  the	  imperfections	  in	  U.S.	  BMD	  systems.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Pakistanis	  caution	  that	  BMD	  –	  regardless	  of	  the	  interception	  rate	  –	  will	  provide	  a	  false	  sense	  of	  security	  to	  Indian	  military	  planners	  and	  incentivize	  aggressive	  behavior.	  	  	  Despite	  the	  skepticism	  over	  the	  technical	  feasibility	  of	  Indian	  BMD,	  Pakistani	  security	  managers	  are	  certain	  to	  prepare	  for	  the	  worst	  and	  seek	  the	  means	  to	  countervail	  a	  missile	  shield.	  	  They	  have	  several	  options	  at	  their	  disposal	  to	  achieve	  this	  aim.	  	  Pakistan	  can	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  to	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  a	  missile	  
shield.”	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overcome	  Indian	  BMD	  through	  sheer	  force	  of	  numbers	  by	  increasing	  its	  fissile	  material	  and	  missile	  production	  capacity.	  	  Penetration	  aids	  such	  as	  MIRVs	  and	  MaRVs	  are	  another	  option,	  as	  well	  as	  high-­‐speed	  cruise	  missiles.	  	  Yet	  these	  technological	  evolutions	  are	  ultimately	  destabilizing	  and	  will	  prompt	  India	  to	  further	  augment	  its	  nuclear	  shield	  and	  arsenal.	  	  The	  bottom	  line	  is	  that	  BMD	  in	  South	  Asia	  will	  heighten	  Pakistan’s	  security	  dilemma	  and	  will	  ultimately	  accelerate	  the	  regional	  nuclear	  arms	  race	  and	  the	  diversification	  of	  delivery	  means.	  	  
Conflict	  Escalation	  Dynamics	  
	  A	  number	  of	  recent	  Track	  II	  meetings	  have	  examined	  conflict	  escalation	  dynamics	  between	  Pakistan	  and	  India.	  	  These	  meetings	  have	  frequently	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  table-­‐top	  exercises	  (TTXs)	  convening	  retired	  Pakistani	  and	  Indian	  flag	  officers,	  civilian	  government	  officials,	  and	  academics.	  	  These	  Track	  II	  efforts	  are	  continuing,	  but	  general	  findings	  thus	  far	  suggest	  that	  a	  limited	  conflict	  in	  South	  Asia	  is	  likely	  to	  escalate	  rapidly	  into	  a	  full-­‐blown	  conventional	  war	  with	  a	  significant	  risk	  of	  nuclear	  exchange.	  	  The	  root	  cause	  of	  this	  upward	  escalatory	  pressure	  is	  mutual	  mistrust,	  which	  necessitates	  all-­‐out	  mobilization	  by	  both	  Pakistan	  and	  India	  at	  the	  onset	  of	  hostilities.	  	  Imagine	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  India	  launches	  limited,	  cross-­‐border	  raids	  into	  Pakistan,	  perhaps	  in	  retaliation	  for	  a	  terrorist	  attack	  similar	  to	  2008	  Mumbai.	  	  Although	  its	  intentions	  are	  limited,	  New	  Delhi	  will	  be	  compelled	  nonetheless	  to	  mobilize	  its	  strike	  corps	  in	  order	  to	  pose	  a	  more	  credible	  and	  balanced	  military	  threat.	  	  Pakistan,	  for	  the	  same	  reason,	  will	  rapidly	  mobilize	  to	  meet	  the	  Indian	  threat	  and	  redeploy	  the	  bulk	  of	  its	  western	  military	  forces	  to	  the	  eastern	  border.	  	  Military	  necessity	  will	  then	  require	  India	  to	  leverage	  its	  air	  force	  to	  interdict	  and	  prevent	  Pakistan’s	  army	  reserves	  from	  reinforcing	  the	  front	  lines.	  	  Islamabad,	  fearing	  the	  worst	  of	  Indian	  intentions	  and	  faced	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  total	  war,	  may	  then	  choose	  to	  disperse	  and	  deploy	  its	  nuclear	  assets	  (both	  tactical	  and	  strategic)	  to	  deter	  further	  Indian	  action.	  	  By	  this	  point,	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  nuclear	  exchange	  becomes	  precariously	  high,	  particularly	  if	  India	  interprets	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  deployments	  as	  an	  offensive	  gambit	  and	  begins	  striking	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  sites	  and	  launch	  platforms.	  	  The	  scenario	  outlined	  above	  conveys	  the	  point	  that	  conditions	  in	  South	  Asia	  are	  prime	  for	  a	  swift	  and	  deliberate	  movement	  up	  the	  escalation	  ladder.	  	  While	  conflict	  escalation	  dynamics	  have	  garnered	  significant	  Track	  II	  attention,	  conflict	  de-­‐escalation	  and	  war	  termination	  remain	  relatively	  unmapped	  subjects.	  	  Future	  Track	  IIs	  should	  address	  this	  research	  gap,	  perhaps	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  TTX	  that	  drops	  the	  players	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  simulated	  conflict	  and	  asks	  them	  to	  design	  and	  execute	  a	  credible	  war	  termination	  plan.	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Confidence-­‐Building	  and	  Arms	  Control	  Gridlock	  
	  The	  distinct	  lack	  of	  progress	  in	  diplomatic	  normalization	  and	  strategic	  restraint	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  is	  hampering	  the	  long-­‐term	  prospects	  for	  nuclear	  stability.	  	  Strategic	  restraint	  is	  comprised	  of	  two	  elements:	  	  confidence-­‐building	  measures	  (CBMs)	  and	  arms	  control	  agreements.	  	  There	  is	  a	  prevailing	  feeling	  that	  most	  of	  the	  low-­‐hanging	  confidence-­‐building	  fruit	  has	  already	  been	  plucked.	  	  CBMs	  currently	  in	  place	  include	  ministerial-­‐level	  crisis	  hotlines,	  1991	  agreements	  on	  mutual	  notification	  of	  military	  exercises	  and	  respecting	  one	  another’s	  airspace,	  a	  1998	  nuclear	  non-­‐aggression	  accord,	  a	  2005	  ballistic	  missile	  flight	  test	  notification	  agreement,	  and	  the	  2007	  nuclear	  accident	  notification	  agreement.	  	  Efforts	  aimed	  at	  expanding	  these	  agreements	  are	  hindered	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  CBMs	  have	  failed	  to	  defuse	  previous	  crises.	  	  The	  bilateral	  and	  much-­‐lauded	  Lahore	  Declaration	  of	  February	  1999,	  for	  example,	  proved	  inconsequential	  three	  months	  later	  when	  Pakistani	  operatives	  infiltrated	  India-­‐administered	  Kashmir	  and	  sparked	  the	  Kargil	  War.	  	  	  Whereas	  the	  pace	  of	  CBMs	  has	  been	  languid,	  the	  status	  of	  arms	  control	  is	  virtually	  frozen.	  	  Pakistan	  and	  India	  remain	  suspicious	  that	  international	  arms	  control	  efforts	  are	  designed	  to	  constrain	  emergent	  nuclear	  powers,	  and	  the	  subject	  never	  gains	  traction	  in	  Track	  I.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  no	  legal	  framework	  in	  place	  to	  limit	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  conventional,	  missile,	  and	  nuclear	  forces	  on	  the	  subcontinent,	  nor	  are	  there	  any	  agreements	  on	  the	  books	  to	  curtail	  fissile	  material	  production.	  	  Pakistan	  and	  India,	  for	  example,	  are	  both	  holdouts	  of	  the	  Comprehensive	  Test	  Ban	  Treaty,	  and	  Islamabad	  continues	  to	  oppose	  the	  FMCT	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  would	  institutionalize	  a	  fissile	  material	  disadvantage	  with	  New	  Delhi.28	  	  The	  United	  States	  can	  help	  break	  the	  confidence-­‐building	  and	  arms	  control	  stalemate	  in	  South	  Asia	  with	  a	  concerted	  diplomatic	  push	  for	  an	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  strategic	  restraint	  regime	  (SRR).	  	  The	  SRR	  should	  have	  four	  components.	  	  First,	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  should	  eschew	  the	  use	  of	  low-­‐intensity	  conflict	  and	  subconventional	  actors	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  national	  policy.	  	  Until	  the	  two	  countries	  reach	  an	  amicable	  understanding	  on	  this	  contentious	  issue,	  cross-­‐border	  terrorism	  will	  continue	  to	  spoil	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  region.	  	  Second,	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  should	  take	  concrete	  steps	  to	  promote	  bilateral	  trade	  and	  investment.	  	  As	  economic	  connectivity	  increases,	  conflict	  will	  become	  more	  costly,	  bilateral	  relations	  will	  gradually	  improve,	  and	  stability	  will	  persevere.	  	  Reports	  that	  Pakistan	  is	  considering	  most-­‐favored	  nation	  trading	  status	  for	  India	  is	  a	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  	  Third,	  New	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Note	  that	  New	  Delhi	  enjoys	  the	  benefit	  of	  external	  uranium	  supply	  thanks	  to	  the	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  nuclear	  deal.	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Delhi	  and	  Islamabad	  should	  adopt	  a	  recessed	  border	  defense	  posture	  and	  establish	  a	  series	  of	  low-­‐force	  zones.	  	  India,	  for	  its	  part,	  should	  eschew	  its	  Cold	  Start	  doctrine	  in	  a	  way	  that	  eases	  Pakistan’s	  strategic	  anxieties	  and	  allows	  Islamabad	  to	  take	  the	  lead	  in	  the	  fourth	  component	  of	  the	  SRR:	  	  nuclear	  restraint.	  	  Specifically,	  Pakistan	  should	  halt	  further	  development	  of	  low-­‐yield,	  tactical	  warheads	  and	  cut	  its	  nuclear	  expenditures	  in	  a	  transparent	  manner.	  	  Obsolete	  delivery	  systems	  such	  as	  the	  Privthi-­‐1	  SRBM	  and	  Hatf-­‐1	  SRBM	  ought	  to	  be	  cooperatively	  dismantled	  as	  a	  means	  of	  inspiring	  mutual	  trust	  and	  assurance	  without	  degrading	  either	  side’s	  net	  deterrence	  quotient.	  	  If	  this	  dismantlement	  program	  is	  successful,	  it	  could	  be	  expanded	  to	  include	  Privthi-­‐2	  and	  Hatf-­‐2	  as	  these	  systems	  age.	  	  Ultimately,	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  should	  negotiate	  a	  South	  Asian	  nuclear	  non-­‐deployment	  zone	  and	  shun	  strategically	  destabilizing	  technologies	  such	  as	  BMD	  and	  penetration	  aids.29	  	  	  	  A	  strategic	  restraint	  regime	  in	  the	  formulation	  outlined	  above	  would	  temper	  the	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  security	  dilemma,	  cool	  strategic	  anxieties,	  and	  slow	  the	  action-­‐reaction	  cycle	  of	  military	  force	  development.	  	  Eventually,	  the	  SRR	  could	  even	  bring	  the	  enduring	  rivals	  to	  state	  of	  rapprochement.	  	  It	  is	  an	  ambitious	  goal,	  however,	  and	  will	  only	  be	  achievable	  if	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  are	  able	  to	  set	  their	  differences	  aside	  and	  accept	  some	  degree	  of	  political	  risk	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  long-­‐term	  harmony.	  	  	  	  
Emerging	  Flashpoints	  for	  Conflict	  
	  Several	  major	  flashpoints	  for	  conflict	  exist	  on	  the	  South	  Asian	  subcontinent.	  	  Some	  of	  these	  flashpoints,	  such	  as	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  are	  well	  known	  and	  have	  been	  debated	  extensively	  in	  the	  Track	  II	  arena.	  	  Other	  flashpoints,	  however,	  are	  slowly	  emerging	  and	  are	  only	  beginning	  to	  gain	  traction	  on	  a	  Track	  II	  level,	  such	  as	  water	  disputes.	  	  With	  Pakistan	  being	  a	  lower-­‐riparian	  state,	  conflict	  could	  occur	  if	  India	  diverts	  the	  flow	  of	  water	  originating	  from	  India-­‐administered	  Kashmir	  away	  from	  Pakistani	  Punjab.	  	  Another	  potential	  flashpoint,	  discussed	  previously,	  is	  an	  inadvertent	  nuclear	  crisis	  on	  the	  high	  seas.	  	  India’s	  Arihant	  SSBN	  will	  complete	  New	  Delhi’s	  triad	  of	  land-­‐,	  air-­‐,	  and	  sea-­‐based	  nuclear	  delivery	  systems,	  and	  Pakistan	  is	  actively	  developing	  a	  pelagic	  deterrent	  of	  its	  own.	  	  Naval	  skirmishes	  are	  generally	  considered	  less	  escalatory	  than	  engagements	  on	  land,	  but	  this	  could	  change	  dramatically	  and	  spectacularly	  if	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  vessels	  are	  nuclear-­‐armed,	  unbeknownst	  to	  the	  adversary.	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  For	  an	  in-­‐depth	  look	  at	  the	  proposed	  SRR	  framework,	  see	  Feroz	  Khan,	  "Strategic	  Restraint	  Regime	  2.0,"	  in	  
Deterrence	  Stability	  and	  Escalation	  Control	  in	  South	  Asia,	  ed.	  Michael	  Krepon	  and	  Julia	  Thompson	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Stimson	  Center,	  2013),	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As	  the	  conventional	  force	  trajectories	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  widen	  and	  the	  Sino-­‐Pakistani	  partnership	  deepens,	  there	  is	  concern	  among	  some	  Pakistani	  scholars	  that	  India	  may	  adopt	  a	  more	  aggressive	  posture	  along	  its	  western	  border	  to	  intimidate	  Islamabad	  into	  submission.	  	  Airspace	  violations,	  skirmishes	  along	  the	  Line	  of	  Control	  in	  Kashmir,	  large-­‐scale	  military	  exercises	  may	  become	  more	  frequent,	  especially	  if	  New	  Delhi	  is	  confident	  in	  its	  BMD	  systems.	  	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  a	  conflict	  could	  quickly	  materialize	  and	  escalate	  before	  the	  international	  community	  can	  intervene.	  	  
Nuclear	  Security	  &	  Safety	  
	  Nuclear	  security	  and	  safety	  was	  not	  a	  major	  issue	  in	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  relations	  until	  after	  9/11.	  	  Three	  factors	  precipitated	  this	  change.	  	  First,	  reports	  emerged	  that	  two	  retired	  Pakistani	  scientists	  had	  met	  with	  Osama	  bin	  Laden	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2001,	  raising	  questions	  of	  personnel	  reliability.	  	  Second,	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Tehrik-­‐i-­‐Taliban	  Pakistan	  (TTP)	  insurgency	  in	  2007	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  string	  of	  terror	  attacks,	  including	  attacks	  on	  Pakistani	  military	  bases.	  	  Third,	  religious	  radicalization	  became	  a	  serious	  societal	  trend	  in	  the	  country.	  	  Taken	  together,	  these	  factors	  led	  to	  increased	  scrutiny	  about	  Pakistan’s	  security	  and	  safety	  protocols.	  	  As	  Pakistan	  continues	  to	  battle	  mounting	  religious	  extremism	  and	  insurgency,	  two	  prominent	  security	  fears	  come	  to	  mind	  –	  first,	  that	  the	  TTP	  or	  a	  similarly	  radical	  group	  might	  somehow	  seize	  power	  and	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  country’s	  nuclear	  arsenal;	  and	  second,	  that	  individuals	  who	  are	  hired	  to	  provide	  security	  or	  otherwise	  maintain	  the	  country’s	  nuclear	  facilities	  could	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  extremist	  sympathizers,	  perhaps	  causing	  a	  nuclear	  accident,	  smuggling	  fissile	  material	  out	  of	  the	  country,	  or	  even	  stealing	  a	  warhead.	  	  Despite	  persistent	  fears	  of	  such	  a	  “low	  probability,	  high	  impact”	  event,	  the	  United	  States	  publicly	  lauds	  Pakistan’s	  progress	  in	  improving	  its	  nuclear	  security	  apparatus.	  	  The	  2011	  Fukushima	  incident,	  however,	  proves	  that	  a	  secure	  facility	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  safe	  one.	  Nuclear	  security	  and	  safety	  are	  sensitive	  topics	  for	  Pakistanis	  on	  the	  Track	  II	  circuit.	  	  Nuclear	  matters,	  by	  default,	  are	  treated	  with	  the	  highest	  state	  secrecy,	  and	  the	  popular	  media	  in	  Pakistan	  occasionally	  makes	  sensational	  claims	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  contingency	  plans	  to	  capture	  and	  dismantle	  the	  country’s	  nuclear	  program.	  	  Many	  Pakistanis	  are	  therefore	  hesitant	  to	  engage	  Americans	  substantively	  on	  such	  issues	  in	  open	  fora.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  these	  impediments,	  nuclear	  security	  and	  safety	  issues	  continue	  to	  be	  raised	  frequently	  at	  the	  Track	  II	  level.	  	  This	  section	  examines	  the	  several	  facets	  of	  the	  security	  and	  safety	  debate:	  	  personnel	  reliability,	  site	  security,	  material	  accounting	  and	  transport,	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training,	  disaster	  response,	  and	  weapon	  surety.	  	  
Personnel	  Reliability	  
	  Pakistan	  has	  a	  personnel	  reliability	  program	  (PRP)	  in	  place	  that	  that	  conducts	  background	  investigations	  to	  evaluate	  the	  trustworthiness	  of	  military	  personnel	  who	  will	  be	  assigned	  to	  work	  at	  nuclear	  installations.	  	  The	  program	  is	  administered	  by	  the	  Strategic	  Plans	  Division	  (SPD)	  and	  is	  intended	  to	  prevent	  extremist	  sympathizers,	  foreign	  intelligence	  agents,	  and	  psychologically	  imbalanced	  individuals	  from	  becoming	  nuclear	  custodians	  and	  posing	  an	  “insider	  threat.”	  	  Pakistan’s	  PRP	  is	  also	  designed	  to	  detect	  any	  subsequent	  changes	  in	  individual	  trustworthiness	  –	  for	  example,	  religious	  radicalization	  –	  through	  a	  method	  of	  annual,	  semiannual,	  and	  quarterly	  review.	  	  Individuals	  who	  maintain	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  clearance	  are	  subject	  to	  increased	  scrutiny.	  	  Security	  vetting	  for	  civilian	  personnel	  is	  handled	  through	  a	  parallel	  evaluation	  system	  also	  run	  by	  the	  SPD,	  known	  as	  the	  human	  reliability	  program	  (HRP).	  Pakistan	  and	  the	  United	  States	  have	  had	  a	  cooperative	  relationship	  on	  personnel	  reliability.	  	  After	  9/11,	  the	  United	  States	  offered	  assistance	  to	  Pakistan	  to	  establish	  a	  rigorous	  vetting	  program.	  	  The	  program	  came	  together	  slowly	  but	  matured	  substantially	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  last	  decade.	  	  Today,	  there	  is	  no	  public	  indication	  that	  Washington	  is	  dissatisfied	  with	  Pakistan’s	  PRP,	  as	  it	  emulates	  U.S.	  best	  practices.	  	  The	  true	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  PRP,	  however,	  is	  unknown.	  	  Pakistan	  does	  not	  publicize	  security	  mishaps	  or	  breaches,	  and	  the	  inner	  details	  of	  the	  PRP	  are	  opaque	  and	  classified.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  impossible	  for	  an	  external	  observer	  to	  accurately	  measure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  PRP.	  	  
Site	  Security	  
	  Pakistan’s	  approach	  to	  nuclear	  site	  security	  is	  to	  deter,	  detect,	  delay,	  defend,	  and	  destroy	  any	  threat	  –	  a	  concept	  known	  as	  the	  “five	  Ds.”30	  	  To	  accomplish	  these	  five	  tasks,	  Pakistan	  has	  implemented	  a	  three-­‐layered	  intruder	  detection	  system,	  managed	  by	  the	  SPD.	  	  The	  outmost	  ring	  is	  a	  surveillance	  and	  intelligence	  collection	  system	  that	  provides	  early	  warning	  and	  detection	  of	  imminent	  or	  potential	  threats.	  	  The	  second	  ring	  is	  the	  SPD’s	  own	  security	  personnel,	  supplemented	  by	  a	  commando	  team	  (“Special	  Response	  Force”)	  that	  is	  exclusively	  tasked	  with	  responding	  to	  intrusions.	  	  The	  innermost	  ring	  consists	  of	  exterior	  and	  interior	  physical	  perimeters	  such	  as	  fences,	  checkpoints,	  and	  personnel-­‐restricted	  security	  doors.	  	  Measures	  are	  also	  in	  place	  to	  detect	  and	  counter	  any	  cyber-­‐attack	  on	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  "National	  Statement:	  Pakistan,"	  Nuclear	  Security	  Summit	  2014,	  March	  2014,	  https://www.nss2014.com/sites/default/files/documents/pakistan.pdf.	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Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  infrastructure,	  and	  security	  procedures	  are	  being	  reviewed	  and	  upgraded	  to	  safeguard	  radioactive	  sources	  at	  hospitals.	  	  
Material	  Accounting	  and	  Transport	  
	   Pakistani	  nuclear	  experts	  are	  confident	  in	  the	  robustness	  of	  their	  material	  accounting	  and	  transport	  practices.	  	  Like	  other	  facets	  of	  nuclear	  security,	  this	  particular	  issue	  is	  not	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Track	  II	  dialogues	  –	  the	  procedures	  are	  technical	  and	  highly	  classified.	  	  What	  is	  known,	  however,	  is	  that	  within	  every	  nuclear	  installation,	  scheduled	  and	  surprise	  inspections	  are	  conducted	  to	  tally	  fissile	  material	  production,	  stocks,	  and/or	  waste.	  	  U.S.	  experts,	  however,	  contend	  that	  material	  accounting	  is	  a	  highly	  challenging	  practice	  that	  takes	  time	  to	  perfect.	  	  	  Pakistan’s	  transportation	  of	  radiological	  materials,	  fissile	  materials,	  and	  warheads	  is	  handled	  through	  military	  convoy,	  with	  theft-­‐proof	  and	  tamper-­‐proof	  containers	  and	  vehicles.31	  	  As	  an	  added	  failsafe	  against	  nuclear	  smuggling,	  the	  SPD	  also	  has	  installed	  radiation	  detection	  sensors	  in	  major	  ports	  of	  entry	  and	  exit.	  	  The	  Pakistan	  Nuclear	  Regulatory	  Agency	  (PNRA),	  which	  oversees	  the	  civilian	  nuclear	  program,	  maintains	  its	  own	  set	  of	  redundant	  sensors.32	  	  
Personnel	  Training	  
	  Personnel	  training	  is	  handled	  by	  Pakistan’s	  “Centre	  of	  Excellence	  for	  Nuclear	  Security,”	  an	  academy	  which	  provides	  instruction	  in	  “nuclear	  security,	  physical	  protection,	  material	  control	  and	  accounting,	  transport	  security,	  and	  personnel	  reliability,”	  as	  well	  as	  nuclear	  disaster	  preparedness	  and	  response.33	  	  Reportedly,	  Pakistan	  is	  also	  collaborating	  with	  the	  IAEA	  to	  expand	  its	  curriculum.	  	  Pakistan	  hopes	  to	  become	  a	  leading	  regional	  provider	  of	  nuclear	  security	  training,	  as	  part	  of	  its	  broader	  effort	  to	  portray	  itself	  as	  a	  responsible	  steward	  of	  nuclear	  assets	  and	  deserving	  candidate	  for	  NSG	  membership.	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  Nuclear	  Security	  Summit	  2014.	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  nuclear	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transport	  practices...	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installation,	  scheduled	  
and	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  inspections	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Incident	  and	  Disaster	  Response	  
	  Nuclear	  incident	  and	  disaster	  response	  has	  obtained	  renewed	  significance	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  2011	  Fukushima	  disaster.	  	  The	  PNRA	  is	  working	  closely	  with	  the	  IAEA	  on	  several	  initiatives	  to	  bolster	  Pakistan’s	  incident	  response	  capacity.	  	  One	  such	  initiative	  is	  the	  Nuclear	  Security	  Action	  Plan	  (NSAP),	  which	  aims	  to	  augment	  Pakistan’s	  ability	  to	  detect	  an	  accidental	  radiological	  release	  and	  mount	  an	  effective	  response	  to	  isolate	  and	  secure	  the	  contaminated	  area.	  	  Civilian	  site	  physical	  protection	  is	  also	  being	  upgraded	  under	  the	  NSAP.	  	  Lessons	  learned	  from	  the	  IAEA	  through	  NSAP	  will	  likely	  be	  leveraged	  to	  improve	  safety	  practices	  at	  military	  nuclear	  facilities.	  Pakistan’s	  current	  system	  for	  responding	  to	  an	  inadvertent	  radiological	  release	  is	  the	  Nuclear	  Emergency	  Management	  System	  (NEMS).	  	  The	  institutions	  responsible	  for	  implementing	  the	  NEMS	  are	  the	  Nuclear	  and	  Radiological	  Emergency	  Support	  Centre	  (NURESC)	  and	  the	  National	  Radiation	  Emergency	  Coordination	  Centre	  (NRECC).	  	  Pakistan	  insists	  that	  the	  NURESC	  and	  NRECC	  are	  well	  equipped	  to	  respond	  to	  and	  manage	  a	  nuclear	  accident.	  	  At	  the	  Track	  II	  level,	  the	  NEMS	  has	  been	  discussed	  only	  tangentially;	  future	  Track	  events	  should	  examine	  disaster	  response	  as	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  topic,	  either	  as	  an	  academic	  workshop	  or	  table-­‐top	  exercise.	  	  
Weapon	  Surety	  
	  The	  surety	  of	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  arsenal	  is	  a	  grey	  area.	  	  Pakistanis	  have	  steadfastly	  maintained	  that	  their	  warheads	  are	  one-­‐point	  safe	  and	  cannot	  be	  detonated	  with	  conventional	  explosives	  or	  tampering.	  	  The	  implication	  here	  is	  that	  an	  extremist	  group	  that	  somehow	  obtained	  a	  Pakistani	  nuclear	  device	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  cause	  a	  fissionable	  event.	  	  What	  Pakistanis	  perceive	  as	  one-­‐point	  safety,	  however,	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  in	  line	  with	  the	  standards	  required	  of	  the	  U.S.	  arsenal.	  	  The	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Manual	  3150.02	  defines	  a	  weapon	  as	  one-­‐point	  safe	  when	  “the	  probability	  of	  producing	  a	  nuclear	  yield	  exceeding	  4	  pounds	  of	  TNT	  equivalent	  is	  less	  than	  one	  in	  1,000,000.”34	  	  U.S.	  history	  indicates	  that	  achieving	  one-­‐point	  safety	  is	  technologically	  challenging	  and	  requires	  years	  of	  experimentation	  and	  testing.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  for	  Nuclear,	  Chemical,	  and	  Biological	  Defense	  Programs,	  DoD	  Nuclear	  
Weapon	  System	  Safety	  Program	  Manual,	  DoD	  Manual	  3150.02	  (January	  2014),	  59,	  http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/315002m.pdf.	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Nuclear	  Energy	  
	  Although	  Pakistan	  has	  operated	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  since	  the	  1970s,	  civilian	  nuclear	  energy	  has	  not	  been	  a	  historically	  major	  issue	  in	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  relations.	  	  Nuclear	  power,	  after	  all,	  accounts	  for	  just	  5.3%	  of	  Pakistan’s	  overall	  energy	  output,	  and	  the	  military	  program	  garners	  most	  of	  the	  attention	  in	  Washington.35	  	  In	  recent	  years,	  however,	  nuclear	  energy	  has	  become	  a	  more	  prominent	  subject.	  Pakistan	  is	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  its	  own	  nuclear	  renaissance	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  Fukushima	  disaster	  has	  cooled	  the	  global	  attitude	  toward	  nuclear	  energy.	  	  Pakistan	  suffers	  from	  frequent	  brownouts	  and	  views	  nuclear	  power	  as	  a	  sustainable	  panacea	  for	  its	  energy	  crisis.	  	  According	  to	  Dr.	  Ansar	  Parvez,	  Chairman,	  Pakistan	  Atomic	  Energy	  Commission	  (PAEC),	  “Our	  future	  plans	  are	  to	  have	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  supply	  one-­‐fourth	  of	  our	  total	  required	  capacity.”36	  	  Specifically,	  Islamabad	  intends	  to	  generate	  8,800	  MW	  of	  nuclear	  power	  by	  2030	  and	  up	  to	  44,000	  MW	  by	  2050.	  	  The	  2050	  plan	  would	  entail	  32	  nuclear	  plants,	  and	  several	  are	  currently	  under	  construction	  with	  Chinese	  assistance.	  	  To	  fuel	  the	  plants,	  Islamabad	  is	  expanding	  its	  own	  uranium	  mining	  capacity	  and	  continues	  to	  lobby	  the	  United	  States	  and	  international	  community	  for	  a	  nuclear	  commerce	  deal.	  Washington	  has	  continually	  rebuffed	  Pakistan’s	  requests	  for	  civilian	  nuclear	  trade	  and	  has	  instead	  provided	  assistance	  in	  hydrocarbon	  (coal,	  oil,	  natural	  gas),	  hydroelectric,	  and	  wind	  power	  through	  USAID.	  	  U.S.	  policymakers	  are	  also	  considering	  additional	  support	  for	  CASA-­‐1000,	  the	  proposed	  electricity	  line	  that	  would	  transmit	  surplus	  power	  from	  Kyrgyzstan	  and	  Tajikistan	  to	  Afghanistan	  and	  Pakistan.37	  	  Pakistan	  has	  gladly	  accepted	  this	  aid	  but	  has	  nonetheless	  turned	  to	  China	  to	  realize	  its	  nuclear	  energy	  goals.	  	  China	  has	  already	  installed	  two	  civilian	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  at	  Chashma,	  with	  two	  more	  under	  construction.	  	  In	  addition,	  two	  ACP-­‐1000	  plants	  are	  being	  installed	  in	  Karachi,	  which	  will	  provide	  2,200	  MW	  in	  total,	  and	  negotiations	  are	  underway	  for	  China	  to	  provide	  three	  more	  plants,	  potentially	  in	  Muzzafargarh.38	  	  China	  also	  provides	  Pakistan	  with	  nuclear	  fuel	  assistance.	  The	  United	  States	  has	  largely	  overlooked	  Sino-­‐Pakistani	  nuclear	  collaboration	  as	  a	  means	  of	  compensating	  for	  its	  unwillingness	  to	  engage	  Islamabad	  in	  civilian	  nuclear	  trade,	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  "Nuclear	  Share	  of	  Electricity	  Generation	  in	  2013,"	  Power	  Reactor	  Information	  System,	  http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/NuclearShareofElectricityGeneration.aspx.	  36	  Mehtab	  Haider,	  "32	  Nuclear	  Plants	  to	  Produce	  40,000	  MW:	  PAEC,"	  The	  News	  International	  (Pakistan),	  February	  27,	  2014,	  http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-­‐News-­‐3-­‐235039-­‐32-­‐nuclear-­‐plants-­‐to-­‐produce-­‐40000MW-­‐PAEC.	  37	  The	  White	  House,	  "Joint	  Statement	  by	  President	  Obama	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Nawaz	  Sharif,"	  news	  release.	  38	  Shah,	  "Pakistan	  in	  Talks	  to	  Acquire	  3	  Nuclear	  Plants,"	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal.	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detractors	  point	  out	  that	  China’s	  transfer	  of	  nuclear	  technology	  and	  fuel	  to	  Pakistan,	  an	  NPT	  outsider,	  is	  forbidden	  by	  the	  NSG.	  	  Beijing	  counters	  that	  its	  nuclear	  energy	  collaboration	  with	  Pakistan	  predates	  China’s	  accession	  to	  the	  NSG	  and	  is	  therefore	  “grandfathered.”	  Critics	  also	  caution	  that	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  nuclear	  power	  in	  Pakistan	  is	  likely	  to	  tax	  its	  nuclear	  security	  and	  safety	  apparatus,	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  incident	  or	  disaster.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  Chinese	  ACP-­‐1000	  plants	  under	  construction	  in	  Karachi	  are	  untested	  designs.	  	  The	  potential	  for	  an	  accident	  has	  left	  many	  Western	  observers	  apprehensive,	  as	  well	  as	  many	  Pakistani	  citizens	  whose	  homes	  are	  in	  the	  vicinity	  of	  new	  and	  planned	  power	  plants.	  	  Many	  Pakistanis	  are	  also	  uneasy	  about	  the	  health	  and	  environmental	  effects	  of	  nuclear	  waste	  disposal.	  Undeterred,	  Pakistan	  sees	  nuclear	  energy	  as	  a	  pathway	  not	  only	  to	  solve	  its	  national	  energy	  crisis	  but	  to	  achieve	  international	  nuclear	  prestige,	  legitimacy,	  and	  normalization.	  	  Pakistan	  hopes	  to	  demonstrate	  to	  the	  world	  that	  it	  can	  run	  and	  maintain	  a	  network	  of	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  while	  following	  international	  best	  practices	  for	  security	  and	  safety.	  	  This	  will	  portray	  Pakistan	  as	  a	  responsible	  nuclear	  steward	  and	  bolster	  its	  case	  for	  membership	  in	  the	  NSG	  and	  perhaps	  an	  eventual	  civilian	  nuclear	  deal	  with	  Washington.	  	  Even	  today,	  Islamabad	  frequently	  cites	  its	  impeccable	  safety	  record	  in	  operating	  nuclear	  power	  plants	  and	  its	  good	  standing	  with	  the	  IAEA	  in	  civilian	  nuclear	  safeguards.39	  	  As	  Pakistan	  asserts	  in	  its	  national	  statement	  from	  the	  2014	  Nuclear	  Security	  Summit	  at	  The	  Hague,	  “Pakistan	  qualifies	  to	  become	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Nuclear	  Suppliers	  Group	  and	  other	  export	  control	  regimes,	  on	  a	  non-­‐discriminatory	  basis.”40	  	  Of	  note,	  Pakistan’s	  national	  statement	  at	  the	  2012	  Nuclear	  Security	  Summit	  in	  Seoul	  closed	  with	  the	  same	  line.	  Civilian	  nuclear	  energy	  is	  frequently	  overlooked	  at	  the	  Track	  II	  level,	  but	  two	  major	  performers	  –	  the	  Center	  on	  International	  Security	  and	  Cooperation	  (CISAC)	  at	  Stanford	  University	  and	  the	  University	  of	  Ottawa	  –	  have	  zeroed	  in	  on	  this	  topic.	  	  CISAC	  has	  examined	  the	  prospects	  for	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  civilian	  nuclear	  cooperation,	  and	  the	  University	  of	  Ottawa	  has	  convened	  retired	  scientists	  to	  explore	  the	  optics	  of	  a	  bilateral	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  deal.	  	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  former	  officials	  and	  scientists	  have	  recommended	  regular	  bilateral	  meetings	  with	  the	  heads	  of	  their	  respective	  atomic	  energy	  commissions,	  nuclear	  regulatory	  bodies,	  and	  emergency	  response	  organizations,	  as	  well	  as	  steps	  to	  harmonize	  disaster	  response	  efforts	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  nuclear	  accident.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  The	  Pakistan	  Nuclear	  Regulatory	  Authority	  (PNRA)	  is	  the	  organization	  charged	  with	  overseeing	  that	  the	  security	  and	  safety	  standards	  of	  the	  national	  nuclear	  industry.	  	  The	  PNRA	  coordinates	  with	  IAEA.	  40	  "National	  Statement:	  Pakistan,"	  Nuclear	  Security	  Summit	  2014.	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The	  United	  States	  should	  encourage	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  civilian	  nuclear	  cooperation.	  	  Although	  the	  two	  states	  remain	  military	  competitors,	  that	  should	  not	  preclude	  Islamabad	  and	  New	  Delhi	  from	  collaborating	  in	  the	  civilian	  nuclear	  realm	  and	  improving	  their	  security	  and	  safety	  processes	  for	  mutual	  benefit.	  	  The	  United	  States	  should	  also	  open	  a	  dialogue	  with	  Pakistan	  on	  nuclear	  energy	  and	  identify	  a	  pathway	  for	  normalizing	  the	  bilateral	  nuclear	  relationship.	  	  While	  a	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  civilian	  nuclear	  deal	  is	  unrealistic	  given	  the	  precarious	  politics	  it	  would	  entail	  inside	  the	  Beltway,	  the	  United	  States	  does	  have	  other	  options	  at	  its	  disposal.	  	  Washington	  can	  continue	  to	  downplay	  Sino-­‐Pakistani	  nuclear	  collaboration	  and	  advocate	  for	  a	  criteria-­‐based	  approach	  to	  membership	  in	  the	  NSG.	  	  A	  criteria-­‐based	  approach	  would	  provide	  Pakistan	  a	  roadmap	  to	  eventual	  membership,	  counter	  Pakistan’s	  accusations	  of	  nuclear	  discrimination,	  and	  support	  Pakistan’s	  quest	  for	  nuclear	  normalization.	  	  This	  policy	  change	  would	  allow	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Pakistan	  to	  finally	  bury	  two	  stumbling	  blocks	  –	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  affair	  and	  the	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  nuclear	  deal	  –	  and	  do	  much	  to	  deepen	  and	  sustain	  the	  bilateral	  relationship	  as	  the	  United	  States	  turns	  its	  attention	  toward	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific.	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CONCLUSIONS The	  past	  decade	  of	  Track	  II	  discourse	  has	  provided	  incredible	  insight	  into	  Pakistan’s	  strategic	  thinking	  and	  threat	  perceptions.	  	  It	  has	  generated	  useful	  and	  candid	  debate	  on	  nuclear	  proliferation,	  stability,	  security	  and	  safety,	  and	  energy,	  and	  it	  has	  forged	  valuable	  professional	  relationships	  between	  American	  and	  Pakistani	  experts.	  	  Track	  II,	  however,	  does	  have	  its	  limitations.	  	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  redundancy	  exists	  on	  the	  Track	  II	  circuit	  because	  there	  are	  numerous	  sponsors	  and	  performers	  with	  no	  unity	  of	  effort.	  	  In	  addition,	  Track	  II	  findings	  are	  slow	  to	  influence	  official	  policy	  due	  to	  bureaucratic	  inertia.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  benefits	  of	  Track	  II	  outweigh	  the	  drawbacks.	  	  Track	  II	  “redundancy”	  generates	  a	  bank	  of	  expert	  analysis	  and	  provides	  deeper	  insight	  into	  a	  country’s	  strategic	  culture	  and	  risk	  environment.	  	  Moreover,	  Pakistani	  officialdom	  maintains	  a	  finger	  on	  the	  pulse	  of	  Track	  II	  discourse	  and	  is	  therefore	  continually	  exposed	  to	  fresh	  policy	  ideas.	  The	  success	  of	  a	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  Track	  II	  event	  depends	  heavily	  upon	  its	  methodology,	  participant	  makeup,	  and	  substantive	  focus.	  	  Track	  II	  discussion	  topics	  should	  be	  narrowly	  scoped	  because	  the	  resultant	  dialogue	  tends	  to	  be	  more	  fruitful.	  	  A	  broad	  topic	  such	  as	  “Indo-­‐Pakistani	  Deterrence	  Stability,”	  for	  example,	  tends	  to	  generate	  highly	  theoretical	  discussions,	  whereas	  a	  project	  that	  exclusively	  examines	  the	  deterrence	  implications	  of	  sea-­‐based	  nuclear	  assets	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  invite	  substantive	  debate.	  	  Participants	  should	  ideally	  be	  a	  blend	  of	  recently-­‐retired	  government	  officials	  and	  Track	  II	  “veterans,”	  and	  young	  and	  emerging	  Pakistani	  security	  scholars	  should	  be	  invited	  whenever	  feasible,	  as	  they	  are	  Pakistan’s	  future	  policy	  advisers	  and	  decision-­‐makers.	  	  As	  for	  the	  substantive	  focus	  of	  Track	  IIs,	  contentious	  issues	  should	  be	  avoided	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  maintaining	  a	  productive	  and	  harmonious	  meeting.	  	  Four	  major	  stumbling	  blocks	  are	  identified	  below.	  	  Americans	  and	  Pakistanis	  tend	  to	  have	  entrenched	  viewpoints	  on	  these	  issues;	  they	  have	  been	  debated	  so	  fully	  there	  are	  virtually	  no	  stones	  left	  unturned	  and	  should	  be	  downplayed	  wherever	  possible:	  (1)	  Allegations	  that	  Pakistan	  is	  providing	  safe	  havens	  to	  the	  Afghan	  Taliban.	  	  Track	  II	  is	  not	  a	  useful	  venue	  for	  debating	  this	  issue.	  	  Pakistanis	  steadfastly	  maintain	  that	  they	  have	  been	  a	  good	  faith	  partner	  in	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism	  and	  have	  the	  casualty	  numbers	  to	  prove	  it;	  discussions	  tend	  to	  devolve	  beyond	  that	  point.	  (2)	  The	  legacy	  of	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  network.	  	  Ten	  years	  have	  passed	  since	  the	  network	  was	  busted,	  and	  Pakistanis	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  a	  dead	  horse	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  buried.	  	  Although	  Western	  criticisms	  may	  have	  validity,	  the	  benefit	  of	  revisiting	  this	  fully-­‐exhausted	  issue	  in	  the	  Track	  II	  arena	  is	  negligible,	  at	  best.	  (3)	  The	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  nuclear	  deal.	  	  Pakistan’s	  displeasure	  with	  the	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  deal	  is	  universally	  known.	  	  There	  is	  no	  need	  to	  revisit	  this	  issue	  and	  reopen	  old	  wounds;	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instead,	  discussions	  should	  focus	  on	  the	  way	  forward	  –	  for	  example,	  the	  criteria	  that	  Pakistan	  would	  need	  to	  meet	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  for	  a	  U.S.	  civilian	  nuclear	  deal	  or	  eventual	  membership	  in	  the	  NSG.	  (4)	  Drone	  strikes	  and	  associated	  sovereignty	  concerns.	  	  Pakistanis	  acknowledge	  that	  drones	  are	  tactically	  effective,	  yet	  they	  bemoan	  U.S.	  drone	  strikes	  as	  strategically	  counterproductive	  and	  antithetical	  to	  Pakistan’s	  sovereignty	  (particularly	  in	  FATA,	  where	  federal	  reach	  is	  delicate	  to	  begin	  with).	  	  Americans,	  meanwhile,	  counter	  that	  drone	  strikes	  are	  necessary	  given	  the	  Afghan	  Taliban’s	  continued	  use	  of	  FATA	  as	  a	  sanctuary	  and	  staging	  area.	  	  The	  debate	  on	  this	  issue	  has	  been	  thoroughly	  exhausted;	  Americans	  and	  Pakistanis	  must	  agree	  to	  disagree.	  Just	  as	  some	  issues	  should	  be	  avoided,	  there	  are	  many	  substantive	  issues	  that	  have	  been	  inadvertently	  overlooked	  and	  deserve	  newfound	  attention.	  	  Track	  IIs	  should	  begin	  to	  explore	  de-­‐escalation	  strategies	  for	  an	  Indo-­‐Pakistani	  conflict,	  because	  thus	  far,	  discourse	  has	  focused	  exclusively	  on	  upward	  escalation	  dynamics.	  	  Participants	  could	  be	  asked	  to	  devise	  credible	  war	  termination	  strategies	  for	  a	  simulated	  conflict	  between	  India	  and	  Pakistan;	  these	  strategies	  could	  be	  deliberated	  subsequently	  in	  an	  academic	  forum	  or	  gamed	  in	  a	  table-­‐top	  exercise.	  	  Another	  topic	  to	  examine	  is	  Pakistan’s	  role	  in	  the	  U.S.	  rebalance	  to	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific.	  	  How	  will	  the	  rebalance	  impact	  the	  Sino-­‐Pakistani	  relationship?	  	  Will	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  interests	  diverge,	  converge,	  or	  remain	  flat?	  Other	  focus	  areas	  for	  future	  events	  include	  nuclear	  disaster	  preparedness,	  consequence	  management,	  and	  risk-­‐reduction	  measures.	  	  Nuclear	  safety	  issues	  can	  only	  be	  expected	  to	  become	  more	  prominent	  as	  Pakistan	  continues	  to	  pursue	  its	  goal	  of	  generated	  8,800	  MW	  of	  nuclear	  power	  by	  2030.	  	  How	  might	  Pakistan	  react	  to	  a	  nuclear	  accident	  or	  near-­‐miss?	  	  	  	  Additional	  topics	  for	  future	  debate	  include	  the	  strategic	  stability	  implications	  of	  new	  cruise	  missiles,	  ballistic	  missile	  defense,	  penetration	  aids,	  and	  sea-­‐based	  deterrents.	  	  What	  will	  be	  the	  interplay	  of	  these	  new	  systems	  and	  how	  will	  they	  change	  the	  strategic	  balance	  in	  South	  Asia?	  	  How	  will	  doctrine	  and	  command	  and	  control	  evolve	  or	  keep	  pace	  with	  the	  rapid	  induction	  of	  new	  technologies?	  	  How	  will	  Indian	  and	  Pakistani	  naval	  platforms	  interact	  after	  nuclear	  weapons	  are	  thrown	  into	  the	  mix?	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recall	  that	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  the	  Track	  II	  process	  is	  to	  develop	  informed	  and	  innovative	  solutions	  to	  complex	  policy	  and	  security	  issues.	  	  These	  solutions	  can	  help	  policymakers	  break	  the	  gridlock	  that	  often	  plagues	  Track	  I	  diplomacy.	  	  The	  central	  policy	  recommendation	  of	  this	  report,	  derived	  from	  over	  a	  decade	  of	  Track	  II	  interactions	  between	  Americans	  and	  Pakistanis,	  is	  for	  Washington	  to	  identify	  a	  potential	  roadmap	  for	  normalizing	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  nuclear	  relations.	  	  The	  United	  States	  remains	  vulnerable	  to	  accusations	  of	  “playing	  favorites”	  in	  South	  Asia	  due	  to	  the	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  nuclear	  deal.	  	  Pakistanis	  argue	  they	  have	  atoned	  for	  the	  sins	  of	  A.Q.	  Khan,	  greatly	  enhanced	  their	  nuclear	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safeguards,	  and	  therefore	  deserve	  de	  facto	  recognition	  of	  their	  nuclear	  status.	  	  Islamabad	  has	  backed	  up	  these	  words	  by	  demonstrably	  improving	  its	  nuclear	  security	  architecture,	  and	  these	  improvements	  have	  been	  lauded	  by	  the	  United	  States	  and	  NGO	  reports	  such	  as	  the	  2014	  Nuclear	  Threat	  Initiative	  Index.	  Although	  a	  “U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  nuclear	  deal”	  is	  not	  politically	  feasible	  at	  this	  juncture,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  consider	  supporting	  a	  criteria-­‐based	  approach	  for	  NSG	  membership,	  providing	  Islamabad	  an	  avenue	  for	  eventual	  accession.	  	  A	  nuclear	  normalization	  drive	  of	  this	  sort	  would	  yield	  substantial	  benefits.	  	  It	  would	  help	  bury	  the	  vitriol	  of	  the	  A.Q.	  Khan	  controversy	  and	  U.S.-­‐Indian	  nuclear	  deal.	  	  It	  would	  move	  the	  entire	  bilateral	  relationship	  forward	  in	  a	  constructive	  manner,	  coax	  Pakistan	  to	  drop	  its	  opposition	  to	  the	  FMCT,	  and	  dampen	  Pakistan’s	  nuclear	  buildup,	  improving	  the	  prospects	  for	  peace	  and	  stability	  on	  the	  subcontinent.	  	  A	  sustainable	  peace	  in	  South	  Asia,	  after	  all,	  is	  indispensable;	  otherwise	  a	  regional	  crisis	  could	  rapidly	  manifest	  and	  distract	  the	  United	  States	  from	  its	  security	  commitments	  elsewhere.	  Before	  embarking	  upon	  nuclear	  normalization,	  however,	  there	  are	  four	  important	  prerequisites	  that	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Pakistan	  should	  fulfill	  to	  repair	  the	  structural	  faults	  in	  the	  bilateral	  relationship.	  	  First,	  Washington	  and	  Islamabad	  should	  restore	  the	  mutual	  trust	  that	  was	  lost	  in	  the	  decade	  after	  9/11.	  	  Second,	  policymakers	  in	  both	  capitals	  should	  take	  into	  account	  one	  another’s	  strategic	  compulsions	  and	  proclivities	  when	  crafting	  regional	  security	  policies.	  	  Third,	  the	  United	  States	  should	  take	  into	  consideration	  Pakistan’s	  desire	  for	  diplomatic	  parity	  on	  par	  with	  India;	  Pakistan,	  for	  its	  part,	  should	  continue	  to	  consolidate	  its	  democracy	  and	  combat	  domestic	  terrorism.	  	  In	  addition,	  Pakistan	  should	  consider	  taking	  demonstrable	  steps	  to	  improve	  stability	  and	  establish	  détente	  on	  the	  subcontinent.	  	  Finally,	  both	  states	  should	  foster	  positive	  public	  opinion	  and	  respond	  to	  domestic	  media	  reports	  that	  grossly	  and	  unfairly	  malign	  one	  another.	  	  Fulfilling	  these	  four	  prerequisites	  will	  require	  concerted	  and	  sustained	  communication	  between	  American	  and	  Pakistani	  stakeholders	  –	  both	  at	  the	  official	  and	  unofficial	  level.	  	  Track	  II,	  by	  extension,	  can	  do	  much	  to	  mend	  and	  reinforce	  the	  bilateral	  relationship.	  	  It	  is	  therefore	  advisable	  to	  expand	  U.S.-­‐Pakistani	  Track	  II	  engagements	  on	  strategic	  and	  nuclear	  matters.	  	  These	  engagements	  will	  allow	  Americans	  and	  Pakistanis	  to	  discuss	  strategic	  issues,	  identify	  irritants	  and	  common	  ground,	  and	  explore	  the	  practicability	  of	  nuclear	  normalization.	  	  	  
